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This paper examines the link between disclosure and the cost of capital. We exploit an exogenous
cost of capital shock created by the Enron scandal in Fall 2001 and analyze firms’ disclosure responses
to this shock. These tests are opposite to the typical research design that analyzes cost of capital responses
to disclosure changes. In reversing the tests and using an exogenous shock, we mitigate concerns about
omitted variables in traditional cross-sectional disclosure studies. We estimate shocks to firms’ betas
around the Enron events and the ensuing transparency crisis. Our analysis shows that these beta shocks
are associated with increased disclosure. Firms expand the number of pages of their annual 10-K filings,
notably the sections containing the financial statements and footnotes. The increase in disclosure is
particularly pronounced for firms that have positive cost of capital shocks and larger financing needs.
We also find that firms respond with additional interim disclosures (e.g., 8-K filings) and that these
disclosures are complementary to the 10-K disclosures. Finally, we show that firms’ disclosure responses
reduce firms’ costs of capital and hence the impact of the transparency crisis.
Christian Leuz
Graduate School of Business
University of Chicago








The link between corporate disclosure, investor information and the cost of capital is one 
of the most fundamental relations in finance and accounting.  Understanding this link is of 
substantial interest to firms that provide information to capital markets as well as to financial 
market regulators who mandate disclosures.  Various theoretical models predict that an increase 
in information quality is negatively related to the cost of capital (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1991; Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Lambert et al., 2007).  Similarly, the estimation risk literature 
suggests that higher quality information should manifest in lower systematic risk and expected 
returns (e.g., Barry and Brown, 1985; Coles and Loewenstein, 1988; Handa and Linn, 1993; 
Coles et al., 1995; Kumar et al., 2008). 
Despite its importance, the empirical evidence on the link between disclosure, 
information quality, and the cost of capital is far from conclusive.  In the estimation risk 
literature, studies often rely on indirect proxies for information quality such as firm age or listing 
period and hence there are alternative interpretations of the results (e.g., Barry and Brown, 1984; 
Clarkson and Thompson, 1990; Kumar et al., 2008).  Studies that use more direct proxies for 
information quality suggest that firms with more extensive disclosures exhibit a lower cost of 
capital, but the evidence is mostly cross-sectional in nature (see, e.g., survey by Leuz and 
Wysocki, 2008).  Thus, there are substantial concerns about whether these relations can be 
interpreted in a causal way since there are reasons to believe that the same factors that drive 
firms’ disclosure choices could also directly affect the cost of capital.
1 
                                                 
1 For example, firms that need to raise external financing for new growth opportunities are likely to increase 
disclosure. However, pursuing these opportunities may also change firms’ cost of capital.  Separating these two 
effects in the cross-section is difficult. -2- 
To mitigate these concerns, this paper relates an exogenous cost of capital shock – the 
Enron collapse – to firms’ disclosure responses, which is essentially the reverse experiment to 
the prior literature.  The events surrounding the collapse of Enron led to substantial concerns 
about the transparency of other U.S. firms, in particular, the quality of their financial statements 
and disclosures.  As such, we use the revelations about Enron as an information-related shock 
that changed investors’ beliefs about the quality (or precision) of their information and hence 
firms’ costs of capital.  The cost of capital shock in turn should lead firms to re-evaluate their 
disclosure policies and trigger changes in their disclosure behavior.  By exploiting this natural 
experiment, we provide new and complementary evidence that disclosure and the cost of capital 
are related as predicted by theory and that firms can influence their cost of capital through firm-
specific disclosures. 
Our analysis focuses on the period when the news about Enron’s losses and accounting 
irregularities hit the market in Fall 2001.  The news quickly grew into widespread concerns about 
the transparency of U.S. corporate reporting and, in particular, about the disclosures of special 
purpose vehicles, off-balance sheet financing, and related-party transactions (see Appendix for 
details).  The concerns culminated in the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in August 2002. 
Our sample comprises 1,868 U.S. firms with December fiscal-year ends and required 
financial data from 1999 to 2001.  We measure shocks to their costs of capital around the Enron 
events using an econometric technique suggested by Lockwood and Kadiyala (1988) that allows 
for a quadratic model to estimate beta during the event window as the transparency crisis was 
unfolding.  We focus on the shock to systematic risk in an attempt to separate cost of capital 
changes from updated assessments of firms’ future cash flows.  The quadratic form is also 
important because it can account for the impact of a firm’s immediate responses during the event -3- 
period on its cost of capital.
2  The first part of the analysis examines firms’ disclosure responses 
to the information-related cost of capital shock.  We analyze responses in firms’ annual SEC 
filings (Form 10-K), which occur after the event period, as well as potentially more immediate 
responses in 8-K filings, conference calls and earnings announcements. 
We document that the cost of capital shocks over the Enron event period are associated 
with an increase in the firms’ disclosures in their subsequent annual 10-K filings.  Firms extend 
the number of pages in their 10-K filings, notably the sections containing narrative discussions 
like Item 7, “Management’s Discussion and Analysis” (MD&A), and Item 13, “Certain 
Relationships and Related Transactions,” as well as the financial statements and footnotes.  This 
evidence shows that firms respond to transparency concerns and cost of capital shocks with 
additional disclosures.  The documented link between cost of capital shocks and additional 10-K 
disclosures is robust to a broad set of alternative specifications and sensitivity checks to address, 
in particular, concerns about the validity of the beta estimates, an undue influence of the events 
of September 11, 2001 and updated cash-flow estimates. 
For firms that experience positive beta shocks, the increase in disclosure is particularly 
pronounced for those that are likely to be more sensitive to their cost of capital because they 
have larger external financing needs and more growth opportunities.  This finding is consistent 
with the idea that the firms most affected by the shock are most likely to respond.  We also find 
that Arthur Anderson clients respond more strongly to the beta shocks, increasing the 10-K pages 
and the section on related-party transactions compared to firms with other auditors.  This finding 
is consistent with our interpretation that the disclosures are a response to the transparency 
concerns created by the Enron scandal. 
                                                 
2 However, we also show that our results are not driven by the choice of a quadratic model and that we obtain 
similar results from a standard market model. -4- 
We also analyze disclosures made in the period immediately after the shock (hereafter 
“interim” disclosures).  Although we do not find a significant relation between the beta shocks 
and the changes in the number of words in the firms’ annual earnings announcements, firms do 
respond by increasing the number of 8-K filings.  The additional 8-K disclosures mitigate the 
effects of the shock but they do not eliminate the relation between the beta shocks and disclosure 
in the 10-K.  This finding is noteworthy because it suggests that firms view the annual 10-K 
filing as a relevant disclosure mechanism to improve transparency and alleviate investor 
concerns, despite its lack of timeliness. 
It is also conceivable that firms respond to the Enron shock with additional disclosures to 
avoid future litigation or to thwart a regulatory response, not to mitigate transparency concerns 
or to address changes in their cost of capital.  This potential alternative explanation, however, 
does not predict the cross-sectional result, described previously, that firms with the largest 
disclosure responses are those that have larger external financing needs and more growth 
opportunities.  Moreover, the notion that firms provide more but not necessarily more 
informative disclosures is difficult to reconcile with our final set of analyses showing that 10-K 
disclosure increases are associated with abnormal volume reactions around the 10-K filing and 
with a subsequent decline in beta.  These findings suggest that the additional disclosures are 
informative to investors and indeed lower the cost of capital.  The latter result is important 
because it implies that even if the Enron scandal did not lead to cost of capital shocks per se but 
nonetheless triggered changes in other firms’ disclosures, these disclosures are related to 
subsequent declines in the cost of capital. 
This study contributes to the prior literature in several ways.  First, by linking 
information-related beta shocks to firms’ disclosure responses, we provide evidence that is less -5- 
likely to reflect an omitted variable that jointly affects disclosures and the cost of capital.  Prior 
studies generally provide evidence from cross-sectional analyses of disclosure or information 
levels (e.g., Botosan, 1997; Botosan and Plumlee, 2002; Easley et al., 2002; Francis et al., 2004, 
2005).  Similarly, the estimation risk literature generally analyzes cross-sectional differences in 
firm characteristics (e.g., Barry and Brown, 1984; Clarkson and Thompson, 1990).  There are a 
few studies that examine changes in disclosure policies (e.g., Healy et al., 1999; Leuz and 
Verrecchia, 2000), use corporate events such as dividend changes or share repurchases (e.g., 
Grullon et al., 2002; Kumar et al., 2008) or exploit disclosure choices when firms access capital 
markets (e.g., Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Schrand and Verrecchia, 2005).  But none of these 
studies identifies an exogenous event that changes firms’ disclosure decisions (including those 
with a design in changes).  Second, our study provides novel evidence that firms respond to 
transparency crises and credibility shocks in markets with increases in their disclosures.  The 
documented disclosure increases occur shortly after the Enron scandal, but preceding the 
political response to the crisis, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.  Finally, we contribute to the 
estimation risk literature by showing that beta estimates respond to an information-related shock 
in predictable ways and that firms’ subsequent disclosure responses reduce the impact of the beta 
shocks, as predicted by theory.  As Kumar et al. (2008) note, such evidence is also useful in the 
ongoing debate about the conditional CAPM (e.g., Wang, 2003; Lettau and Ludvigson, 2001). 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 develops the hypotheses and explains our 
research design exploiting the Enron events in 2001.  In section 3, we define our disclosure and 
cost of capital proxies.  Sections 4 and 5 present the results on the relation between the cost of 
capital shocks and firms’ disclosure responses.  Section 6 presents the analysis of subsequent 
market responses to firms’ disclosure responses.  Section 7 concludes the paper. -6- 
2.  Hypothesis development and research design 
There is a long-standing literature in financial economics providing theories on the 
relation between investor information and the cost of capital (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 
1991; Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Lambert et al., 2007).  An implication of these theories is that a 
change in investor information (e.g., its precision) leads to a change in the cost of capital.   
Optimal disclosure behavior in turn implies that firms respond to information-related shocks to 
their cost of capital by changing their disclosure policy.  That is, assuming that a firm’s 
disclosure policy is optimal at a given point in time, an information-related shock to the cost of 
capital should lead to a reassessment of its disclosure policy.  Our main prediction is that, ceteris 
paribus, firms with increases in their cost of capital are likely to increase their disclosures.   
Furthermore, firms’ disclosure increases should lead to subsequent reductions in the cost of 
capital.  Relating firms’ disclosure responses to an information-related shock as well as 
consequent cost of capital changes to the new disclosures should provide evidence that investor 
information and the cost of capital are indeed related as predicted by theory. 
To test these predictions, we exploit the events at Enron as an exogenous shock to other 
firms’ costs of capital.  On October 16, 2001, Enron announced a third quarter loss of $618 
million and hinted at problems with its partnerships.  On November 29, 2001, Enron announced 
it would restate its earnings back to 1997 and add $628 million of debt to its 2000 balance 
sheet.  Between these events, the SEC launched an inquiry into Enron’s accounting practices 
and then initiated a formal investigation that included Enron’s auditors, Arthur Anderson.   
Subsequently, Enron was removed from the S&P 500, its debt was downgraded to junk and, 
eventually, it filed for bankruptcy.  Appendix A.1 provides more details on the sequence of 
events. -7- 
We believe that the nature of the Enron scandal is particularly suited to our analysis.  
The announcements revealed that Enron had been able to hide its economic and financial 
condition, despite compliance with SEC financial reporting requirements, which led to general 
concerns about U.S. financial reporting quality.  As such, the Enron events likely caused 
investors to revise their beliefs about the precision (or quality) of their information.   
Furthermore, even if the Enron scandal was a symptom of a larger transparency crisis, the 
timing of this shock should be exogenous to other firms, which is all we need for our empirical 
strategy. 
The following timeline provides a stylized overview of our research design and how it 
relates the events at Enron to our main hypothesis: 
Pre-event-period  Event period  Pre-report period  Post-report period 
  ↑↑↑↑  ↑  
  Enron events unfold  Disclosure Response 
In the pre-event period, firms are in equilibrium with respect to their disclosure decisions.  
Investors have rational expectations over firms’ future cash flows and the precision of their cash 
flow estimates.  In the event period, the Enron scandal unfolds and leads to investor concerns 
about a systematic lack of transparency in U.S. financial reporting.
3  As a result, investors revise 
their beliefs about the precision of their estimates for other firms in the economy, which changes 
firms’ cost of equity capital.  This information-related shock to the cost of capital alters firms’ 
optimal disclosure levels and hence they adjust their disclosure policies.  In response to firms’ 
disclosures, investors revise and update their beliefs and the cost of capital adjusts again. 
By relating investors’ uncertainty about their information set to expected returns and 
hence firms’ cost of capital, the estimation-risk literature provides the conceptual underpinnings 
                                                 
3 See Appendix A.1 for citations to articles in the financial press that suggest that the market viewed the Enron 
scandal as indicative of widespread transparency problems in the U.S. -8- 
for our analysis and, in particular, investors’ reactions to the Enron shock.  This literature starts 
from the premise that the parameters of the return-generating process are generally not known 
and have to be estimated (e.g., Klein and Bawa, 1976, 1977).  While early studies conclude that 
the effects are diversifiable (e.g., Brown, 1979; Reinganum and Smith, 1983), Barry and Brown 
(1985) show that estimation risk is not diversifiable when information is differentially distributed 
across securities.  Extending this finding, Coles and Loewenstein (1988) and Coles et al. (1995) 
show that when modeling estimation risk with respect to asset payoffs (rather than returns) 
estimation risk is not diversifiable and affects equilibrium returns and betas even when 
information is symmetrically distributed.  Along similar lines, Lambert et al. (2007) analyze 
information structures that lend themselves more naturally to an interpretation as firm-specific 
disclosures about future cash flows and show that more precise disclosures move firms’ cost of 
capital closer to the risk-free rate.  This effect is again not diversifiable and manifests itself in 
firms’ beta factors as well as the market risk premium for the economy.
4  Finally, Kumar et al. 
(2008) analyze the effects of estimation risk on the cross section of stock returns and firms’ cost 
of capital when investors learn from information of uncertain quality (or precision).  They 
demonstrate that, in this situation, asset prices, firms’ beta factors, and the market risk premium 
are estimation-risk dependent and respond to changes in the quality of information.
5 
Based on these theories, we expect that the Enron events led to an information-related 
shock to firms’ cost of capital.  We focus on changes in firms’ beta factors for two reasons.  
First, the Enron events may have had an impact on investors’ expectations of future cash flows 
                                                 
4 As Lambert et al. (2008) show, the link between information and the cost of capital in Easley and O’Hara (2004) is 
solely driven by precision effects and very similar to the link described above, except that the analysis in Easley and 
O’Hara (2004) is limited to effects on firm-specific variances, which makes them diversifiable. 
5 Kumar et al. (2008) also provide empirical evidence that beta factors fall immediately after dividend initiations and 
share repurchases, i.e., corporate events that can be interpreted as reducing information uncertainty. Similarly, Barry 
and Brown (1984) and Clarkson and Thompson (1990) find that systematic risk of low information firms decreases 
as time passes (e.g., the length of their listing period) and information increases. -9- 
for some firms and not just on the precision of their cash flow estimates.  By focusing on 
changes in firms’ beta factors, rather than abnormal returns, we attempt to separate cost of 
capital and cash flow effects.  In addition, we include industry controls in all analyses and we 
check that our results are not driven by or sensitive to the inclusion of energy firms, for which 
the Enron events likely had significant cash flow effects.  We also conduct a robustness analysis 
that uses changes in (analysts’) earnings expectations as a control for updated assessments of 
future cash flows.  Second, it is likely that the Enron events increased the market risk premium.  
However, shocks to the risk premium apply to the entire economy and are constant across firms.  
The beta factor in turn exacerbates or dampens any premium shocks for a given firm and hence 
appropriately captures cross-sectional differences in the cost of capital shock.
6 
In addition, the Enron shock could have affected investors differentially and hence could 
have altered information asymmetries among investors.  Increased information asymmetry can 
raise the market risk premium demanded by investors as well as the firm-specific cost of capital 
(e.g., Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; Garleanu and Pedersen, 
2004; Lambert and Verrecchia, 2008).  However, information asymmetry effects do not alter our 
primary hypothesis that the Enron shock led to changes in firms’ cost of capital and that, ceteris 
paribus, firms with increases in their cost of capital respond with an increase in disclosure. 
We also make several cross-sectional predictions.  We predict that firms that are more 
sensitive to their cost of capital because, for example, they have greater external financing needs, 
increase their disclosures more than less sensitive firms.  We predict firms with larger credibility 
issues after the Enron events to respond more strongly, holding all else equal.  Finally, it is 
possible that firms with a positive cost of capital shock respond by increasing their disclosure, 
                                                 
6 We note that without estimating changes in the market risk premium, we cannot quantify the full magnitude of the 
cost of capital shock, but doing so is not necessary for a cross-sectional design. -10- 
while firms with a negative shock maintain their policies.  Such a response is likely if the costs 
of retaining disclosures are small. 
To test these hypotheses in the context of the Enron events, we estimate variations of the 
following general specification of a cross-sectional model: 
Change in disclosure = α + beta shock + control variables + ε (1) 
and also separate models for firms that experience a positive shock and have a higher sensitivity 
to their cost of capital versus all other firms.  We first analyze average changes in disclosure in 
firms’ annual 10-K filings as the shock occurred during the fourth quarter of 2001.  Thus, firms 
could respond in their annual filings with the SEC, which are due 90 days after year end.  In the 
timeline above, we measure the beta shocks during the event period and then separately in the 
pre-report period to account for the possibility that firms respond to the shock with interim 
disclosures (or costly signals) during or after the event period but before filing the 10-K.   
Although the news about Enron’s problems was a surprise to the market and occurred during a 
relatively short window, the event period is long enough that a firm may respond to the shock 
during the event period or shortly thereafter.  Responses could be interim disclosures, such as 
conference calls or press releases, or costly financial signals, such as changes in the dividend 
policy or stock repurchases. 
We explicitly account for such interim responses in our second set of analyses.  We 
estimate equation (1) but include measures of changes in 8-K filings, conference call activity, 
and disclosures in the fourth-quarter earnings announcement as controls.  We also estimate 
equation (1) using our various interim disclosure proxies as the dependent variable.  These 
analyses serve three purposes.  First, evidence that firms respond immediately to the cost of 
capital shock in predictable ways serves to increase the confidence in our shock proxies.   -11- 
Second, including these disclosures in the model of 10-K disclosures mitigates concerns about 
omitted variables.  If an omitted variable drives firms to increase disclosure in the 10-K, it 
likely also causes firms to increase other disclosure.  In this case, including proxies for changes 
in the other disclosures in the model should attenuate the coefficient on the beta shocks, which 
we examine.  Third, the analysis provides evidence on the role of the 10-K filing as a disclosure 
instrument.  The 10-K must be filed within 90 days after the fiscal-year end and hence it may 
not be a timely vehicle to reduce transparency concerns.  At the same time, the 10-K may be 
particularly appropriate to address such concerns because it contains audited financial 
statements and it is subject to SEC review.  Thus, if more timely but potentially less credible 
interim disclosures are substitutes for disclosure responses in the 10-K, there may be no 
association between the beta shocks over the event period and firms’ 10-K responses when we 
control for interim disclosures.  If, however, interim and 10-K disclosures are complements, the 
relation between the beta shock remaining after the interim response and the 10-K disclosures 
is attenuated unless we control for interim responses. 
In our third and final set of analyses, we invert the model in equation (1) and examine 
subsequent market reactions to firms’ disclosures responses after the Enron shock.  If the 
disclosures are useful to investors and increase the precision of their information, the market 
should respond to the release of this information and the cost of capital should decline.  In 
performing these analyses, we also investigate the alternative hypothesis that firms increase their 
disclosure following the crisis merely to address concerns about litigation or to thwart future 
regulation.  If firms provide additional disclosures that are not informative to investors (but 
reduce litigation risk), we do not expect the disclosure changes to be related to subsequent -12- 
declines in the cost of capital.
7  In this analysis, we measure the cost of capital response to a 
disclosure change, which is closer in design to traditional disclosure studies, except that we use 
cross-sectional variation in disclosure that is generated by an exogenous shock. 
Finally, we note that there are several reasons the predicted relations may not prevail.  
First, the Enron crisis may not have resulted in an information-related shock for other firms, 
despite widespread claims in the press at the time.  Second, the link between financial disclosure 
and the cost of capital may not exist in the way predicted by theory.  Third, it is conceivable that 
managers do not expect that they are able to address the transparency concerns via increased 
disclosure, and thus they do not respond in this way. 
3.  Empirical proxies and descriptive statistics 
3.1 Sample 
The sample includes all firms on Compustat that have fiscal year ends on December 31
st 
and non-missing values for total assets and earnings announcement dates in each of the three 
years from 1999 – 2001.  We exclude firms with non-December fiscal-year ends to align firms 
with respect to the timing of their disclosures.  We exclude REITS, Limited Partnerships, Trusts 
and Funds from the sample.  In addition, we eliminate 233 firms that likely were significantly 
influenced by the events of September 11, 2001.  First, we exclude all airlines and insurance 
carriers from our sample.  Carter and Simkins (2004) and Doherty et al. (2003) show that the 
events of September 11 had a significant effect on airlines (SIC 45) and insurance carriers, 
respectively.  Second, we eliminate firms that file an 8-K between September 11 and the peak of 
our event period (November 8) that mentions the terrorist attacks, suggesting that the events of 
                                                 
7 Note that if firms provide additional disclosures in response to the Enron debacle but not necessarily to the cost of 
capital shocks, our analysis of subsequent changes in the cost of capital is still useful and valid as long as the Enron 
shock produces exogenous variation in firms’ disclosure choices. -13- 
September 11 had a material impact.  While our event period does not start until mid October, 
excluding these firms mitigates the concern that the returns and beta estimates for these firms 
reflect ongoing valuation adjustments associated with the terrorist attacks. 
We require data for 1999 and 2000 to create control variables and also benchmarks to 
measure changes in disclosure.  The final sample contains 1,868 firms for which we have return 
data to compute the cost of capital shocks, Compustat data to compute the primary control 
variables, and 10-K filings data to create the disclosure proxies. 
3.2 Event window 
We consider seven different window specifications to define the pre-event period, the 
event period, and the pre-report period (see Appendix A.2).  In all cases, the pre-event window 
starts on May 1, 2001, which for firms with December fiscal-year ends is after the year 2000 
annual report season, and runs through August 31, 2001.  This period precedes the market 
closings caused by the terrorist attacks on September 11.  These events are excluded from the 
event period, which starts at the earliest on October 15, 2001.  The pre-report period ends either 
on January 15, 2002 or January 28, 2002, prior to the annual earnings announcement season.  
Choosing the later date increases the length of the pre-report period and hence the power to 
measure systematic risk, but it is more likely that the beta estimates include the effects of early 
earnings announcements.  Similarly, the choice among the different windows involves trading 
off a longer event period, which allows us to more precisely measure the Enron shock, against a 
shorter pre-report period, which makes it more difficult to accurately measure the beta prior to 
the 10-K filing. 
Throughout the paper, we present results for Window 1, which is centered on November 
8 and has an event-period length of 39 days.  The pre-report period ends on January 15, 2002.  -14- 
The Appendix provides evidence to justify this choice.  The results are robust to alternative 
windows and generally stronger if we focus on those windows that maximize the length of the 
period over which the respective betas are estimated.  The post-report period is consistently 
defined across all analyses as May 1, 2002 to August 31, 2002. 
3.3   Disclosure proxies 
Our main proxy for a change in disclosure is the percent change in the page count of the 
10-K for 2001 from 2000 (% PAGES Δ ).  Page count data are from the Global Securities 
Information (GSI) database, which covers all SEC filings that are available in the EDGAR 
database.  We eliminate all filings with less than 10 pages.  Most of these observations are 
references to a fuller document and not the page count of the 10-K.
8  The page counts are for the 
body of the 10-K (i.e., Items 1 through 15), which includes the exhibits and financial statement 
schedules in Item 15.  The page counts exclude separate exhibits and appendices to the 10-K 
filing beyond Item 15.  While those exhibits and appendices could include useful information 
(e.g., material contracts), they are not sufficiently standardized in format and content to provide a 
meaningful proxy for variation in information content or disclosure. 
We also measure page count changes for three key sections within the 10-K.    The 
variable  MDA %Δ  is the percent change in pages for Item 7, Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis of Results of Operations and Financial Condition (MD&A).  The variable  FS %Δ  is the 
percent change in the pages of 10-K sections that commonly include the financial statements and 
notes.  The sections used to create this proxy are Item 6 (Selected Financial Data), Item 8 
(Financial Statements and Supplementary Data), and Item 15 (Exhibits, Financial Statement 
                                                 
8 Fifty-six sample firms switch from (to) filing a 10-K to (from) a 10-KSB.  Using a different form likely affects the 
page count.  However, the results are virtually the same if we drop these firms. -15- 
Schedules, and Reports on Form 8-K).  The variable  DISCUSS %Δ  is the percent change in the 
pages of 10-K sections that commonly include important narrative discussions and information.  
The sections used to create this proxy are Item 1 (Business), Item 2 (Properties), and Item 7 
(MD&A).  These three proxies for key subsections address concerns that the page changes for 
the entire 10-K occur in less important parts.  By combining multiple items,  FS %Δ  and 
DISCUSS %Δ  further mitigate problems associated with small numbers of pages in the 
individual sections and with rearranging the location of information within the 10-K, which are 
more likely to arise for  MDA %Δ .
9 
For all of the percent change variables, the benchmark is the page count in the prior year.  
We create an alternative proxy that uses the average of the 1999 and 2000 page counts.  Results 
are very similar for this alternative variable and are not presented.  We truncate % PAGES Δ  
above the 98
th percentile and below the 2
nd percentile.  For the other percentage change variables, 
we have manually screened for a number of issues that could produce outliers (such as 
rearranging of information within the 10-K) and hence we truncate only above the 99
th percentile 
and below the 1
st percentile to conserve sample size.
10  Winsorizing rather than truncating the 
variables yields similar results. 
Table 1, Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the page count variables.  The average 
10-K in 2001 has 64 pages ( 2001 PAGES ), which is almost a 17% increase over 2000.  This 
increase is statistically different from zero and far exceeds the average page change from 1999 to 
                                                 
9 For all three variables, we attempt to exclude observations that appear to have rearranged the location of 
information within the 10-K.  Observations that report an item in the current year that was incorporated by reference 
in the previous year (or vice versa) are eliminated under this criterion.  We identify observations that potentially 
rearranged the 10-K using various data filters.  For these observations, we examine the 10-K to verify that 
disclosures within the 10-K were rearranged across various sections. 
10 Truncating the percentage change in total pages at the 99
th and 1
st percentile does not materially alter our results. 
However, the 43 additional observations that are gained due to the milder truncation at the 1% level are flagged by 
common outlier procedures.  The inspection of these observations for the 10-K part analysis also confirms this 
assessment, which is why we choose to truncate at the 98
th and 2
nd percentile. -16- 
2000, which equals only 3.4% (untabulated).  The difference between the increase from 1999 to 
2000 and the increase from 2000 to 2001 is statistically significant, suggesting that firms 
significantly expanded their 10-K filings in 2001 beyond the normal rate. 
We investigate whether this increase in pages could be due to new disclosure 
requirements or accounting standards.  For the fiscal 2001 reporting year, a search of SEC 
actions affecting 10-K reporting yields two noteworthy changes.  First, the SEC required firms to 
include an additional table in the 10-K related to components of its equity compensation plan.  In 
terms of page increases, this requirement should have increased 10-K filings of all firms by one 
page.  Second, the SEC issued new guidance for the MD&A suggesting that firms pay particular 
attention to discussions of off-balance-sheet arrangements, certain investment trading activities 
and related-party transactions.  This guidance appears to be a direct response to the issues that 
arose for Enron.  In addition, the FASB issued three new accounting standards during the 
period.
11  All of the new standards likely affected only the disclosures of firms that had an 
impairment loss on their assets.  Such losses are generally reflected as special items in the 
income statement.  We therefore check that our results are robust to a specification that controls 
for special items in Section 4.2.  In sum, it seems unlikely that the substantial increase in 10-K 
disclosures from 2000 to 2001 is primarily the result of new accounting or disclosure 
requirements.  But even if new requirements were the primary impetus, our analysis that relates 
cross-sectional variation in the new disclosures to firms’ cost of capital shocks is still valid as 
long as firms’ responses to the new standards are not also closely aligned with the beta shocks. 
                                                 
11 Statement of Financial Accounting Standards (SFAS) No. 142, “Goodwill and other intangible assets;” SFAS No. 
143, “Accounting for asset retirement obligations;” and SFAS No. 144, “Accounting for the impairment or disposal 
of long-lived assets.” -17- 
Turning to the sub-sections of the 10-K filing, the MD&A section in 2001 has on average 
13.3 pages, which is a 39% increase over 2000.  The section with narrative discussions (financial 
tables and footnotes) has on average 27 (34) pages, which represents an increase of 22% (18%) 
over year 2000.  The MD&A, narrative, and financial sections are longer than in 2000 for over 
75% of the sample observations. 
Because the Enron scandal involved special purpose vehicles and partnerships that were 
run by corporate insiders, we also create a proxy for disclosure changes about related-party 
transactions.  In doing so, we face two challenges.
12  First, while the 10-K requires disclosures on 
related-party transactions (Item 13), firms generally satisfy this requirement with a reference to 
their proxy statement.  We therefore examine both the 10-K and the proxy statement and select 
the page count from the appropriate document for each year before computing a change.   
Second, disclosures on related-party transactions are often only one or two pages long, which can 
create a small-denominator problem when computing percentage changes.  Moreover, it creates 
the issue that changes of plus or minus one page can produce substantial percentage changes, 
even though they are essentially measurement error.  For example, a one-page related-party 
section that starts at the top of a page is counted as one page, but if it starts in the middle of the 
page next year, it may count as two pages.  We therefore classify page changes of -1 and +1 as a 
zero change. 
After these adjustments, we compute the percentage change in the number of pages 
relative to the fiscal 2000 related-party disclosure section (%R E L _ P A R Δ ).  The page counts are 
derived from the 2001 10-K or the proxy statement with a filing date between December 31, 
2001 and June 30, 2002.  We delete extreme percentage changes that are in the 1
st or the 99
th 
                                                 
12 In addition, there is the issue that a very meaningful (but short) disclosure may be to simply state that the firm has 
or had no related-party transactions. -18- 
percentile.  Table 1, Panel A shows that the average related-party disclosure has 5 pages, but the 
median is equal to one page only.  From 2000 to 2001, the related-party disclosures increase by 
19.4% which is statistically different from zero. 
Our next disclosure proxy is the change in the number of words of the fiscal 2001 
earnings announcement relative to the fiscal 2000 earnings announcement (%ΔWORDS).  The 
number of words in each announcement is determined based on a manual search of earnings 
announcements for our sample firms on Dow Jones Interactive.  We use only announcements on 
Business Wire or PR Newswire, as these two sources furnish unmodified press releases.  We 
delete extreme changes in the word count that are in the 1
st and 99
th percentile.  Panel A of Table 
1 reports that the average earnings announcement has 2,003 words (WORDS2001), which is a 
15.5% increase over the number of words in the prior year fourth-quarter earnings 
announcement. 
The next disclosure proxy is constructed from 8-K filings.  Firms are required to use the 
form 8-K to notify investors of any unscheduled material event that is important to shareholders 
or the SEC.  The SEC defines required reportable events (e.g., shutting down a plant), and it also 
requires more generally that firms use the 8-K form to disclose material information and to 
update any information provided in previous SEC filings.  Short-window abnormal returns 
around 8-K filings suggest that they are informative (e.g., Beneish et al., 2005).  In our context, 
8-K filings could be used to respond to the Enron shock and alleviate transparency concerns.
13 
                                                 
13 For example, on December 5, 2001, American Express filed an 8-K, which simply reported: “In view of the 
situation involving Enron, the company is analyzing its exposure, but preliminarily believes any impact will not be 
material.”  Another 8-K followed on February 6, 2002 and stated: “First, in terms of the financial impact of Enron's 
bankruptcy, back in early December we filed an 8-K indicating that we preliminarily believed the impact from 
Enron would not be material.  Having now completed our review, this statement is still true.  Second, we have also 
reviewed our business and accounting practices in light of Enron's recent issues.  Based on this review, we can see 
no parallels between our businesses and what we understand the practices were at Enron.  Here are a few specifics.”  
 -19- 
We count each firm’s 8-K filings during the period from October 15, 2001, which is the 
beginning of our event period using Window 1, to March 31, 2002 and the same period one year 
earlier (8KCOUNT).  In these counts, we exclude filings related to the terrorist attacks on 
September 11, deleting those that refer to this date or include related words like “terrorist.”  We 
then compute the difference in the 8K counts from 2000 to 2001 (Δ8KCOUNT).  We set all 
differences that are larger than three in absolute value equal to 3 and -3, respectively.  Table 1, 
Panel A shows that sample firms file on average about one 8-K during the period, although the 
median number of filings is zero.  Excluding 8-K filings related to the events of September 11, 
the average change in the number of filings is close to zero. 
Our last disclosure proxy is based on changes in the number of conference calls.  As for 
the 8-K filings, we count the number of conference calls from October 15, 2001 to March 31, 
2002 (CONFCALL) and compute the difference relative to the same window the year earlier 
(ΔCALL).  Increases (decreases) that are larger than three in absolute value are set equal to 3 (–
3).  Table 1, Panel A shows that, on average, firms hold one conference call over the 
measurement period and the number of calls decreases slightly relative to the prior year. 
Table 1, Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the control variables in the analyses.  
We use proxies for firm characteristics that are commonly viewed as determinants of firms’ 
disclosures, i.e., firm size, performance, financing needs and growth opportunities (e.g., Lang 
and Lundholm, 1993; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008).  We truncate all control variables at the 1
st 
percentile and the 99
th percentile and measure them as of the beginning of the fiscal year, unless 
noted otherwise.  In untabulated regressions, we confirm that the levels of our disclosure proxies 
exhibit meaningful associations with the control variables. 
                                                                                                                                                             
The 8-K continues with a discussion of special purpose entities, off-balance-sheet financing, and employee conflict 
of interest, all three of which were problems at Enron. -20- 
3.4   Cost of capital shocks 
To construct measures of systematic risk in the pre-event period, the event period, and the 
pre-report period, we employ a regime-switching model suggested by Lockwood and Kadiyala 
(1988).  The method, which nests traditional methods, permits event-induced changes in 
systematic risk and provides period-specific beta estimates, which we then use to construct cost 
of capital shocks.  Separately, we estimate the post-report period beta after the annual report 
season from May 1, 2002 to August 31, 2002 using a standard market model. 
Following Lockwood and Kadiyala (1988) and Cyree and DeGennaro (2002), the model 
specification is: 
  it mt it i it ε R b a R + + =  (B1) 
  ] 1 ) 1 ( 2 ) 1 2 [( 1 ) 2 )( 1 ( 3 2 1 it it i it i i it D T t D T T b D T t t T b b b − + − + − − + =  (B2) 
where  it R  is the daily holding period return for firm i from CRSP on day t (including dividends) 
and  mt R  is the value-weighted return on the market from CRSP for day t.  Systematic risk varies 
as a function of the trading day t (equation B2).  T1 and T2 define the event period.  They are 
specified as the number of trading days in the event period relative to day t.  For window 1, our 
event period extends from October 15 through December 5 (inclusive), which contains 39 CRSP 
trading days, and it is centered on November 8 (t = 0), with T1 set at -19 and T2 set at +19.  D1 
and D2 are indicator variables that equal one if a trading day falls into the event period or the 
pre-report period, respectively.
14 
                                                 
14 The event window includes the third quarter earnings announcement period.  We repeat the estimation excluding 
return observations on the earnings announcement date and the previous day.  The estimates of  1 ˆ
i b  and  3 ˆ
i b are 
virtually identical.  The exclusion of returns on these days has a bigger impact on  2 ˆ
i b but even then it is 
economically small (at the 5
th digit) and the estimates are not significantly different.  The results presented in the 
paper are based on the estimates that include the returns on the third quarter earnings announcement date. -21- 
From the model parameters, we create separate cost of capital measures for the pre-event, 
event, and pre-report periods.  First, systematic risk for the pre-event period (BETA_PRE) is 
equal to  1 ˆ
i b .  This parameter is a constant throughout the pre-event period.  This estimate serves 
as a benchmark for the firm’s beta prior to the transparency shock.  During the event period, 
when D1 = 1 and D2 = 0, systematic risk is determined by the parameter estimates for 
12 3 ˆˆ ˆ , ,  and  ii i bb b .  The quadratic specification allows for the initial shock to the cost of equity 
capital to be either positive or negative.  The parameter  2 ˆ
i b  captures the direction and the 
curvature of the initial shock.  The quadratic specification also allows for (but does not require) a 
recovery of the shock during the event period.  Thus, the quadratic form of the regime-switching 
model can accommodate the impact of interim disclosure responses on firms’ costs of capital 
during the event period.  We confirm in Section 5 that the curvature and firms’ interim 
disclosures are, in fact, related as hypothesized. 
We compute the event beta (BETA_EVT) at day t = 0, which represents the peak given 
the quadratic specification.  This beta is computed from (B2) by setting t = 0 and recognizing 
that our event window is symmetric and hence T2 = -1*T1: 
 
2
212 3 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ (2 ) 2 ii i i bb T b T β =+ +  (B3) 
After the shock and during the pre-report period, systematic risk is given by: 
  ) 1 2 ( ˆ ˆ ˆ
3 1 3 T T b b i i i − + = β  (B4) 
Like the pre-event beta, the pre-report or remaining beta (BETA_REM) is constrained to 
be a constant across the period. -22- 
To provide intuition for the parameters, Figure 1 illustrates time-series patterns of 
systematic risk for the pre-event period, the event period, and the pre-report period under 
alternative estimates for  23 ˆˆ  and  ii bb .  Panels A through C illustrate the behavior of systematic risk 
in the cases of HIGH positive  2 ˆ
i b  (equals 0.100), LOW positive  2 ˆ
i b  (equals 0.002), and negative 
2 ˆ
i b  (equals -0.002), respectively.  Within each panel, we present estimates of systematic risk in 
the pre-report period for five levels of  3 ˆ
i b .  In all three panels, the pre-event beta estimates are 
constant over the period.  The pre-report betas also are constant throughout the period, but they 
can be higher or lower than the pre-event beta.  When  3 ˆ
i b  is positive, the pre-report beta is higher 
than the pre-event beta.  Furthermore, the pre-report beta can be higher than the event beta, even 
when  2 ˆ
i b  is positive, if 
2
32 ˆˆ 2( 2 ) ii bT b T > . 
Before computing the shocks, we truncate the beta estimates in each period at the 1
st and 
the 99
th percentile.  In addition, we drop observations for which the beta appears to unstable as 
indicated by a significantly positive estimate in the pre-event period but a significantly negative 
estimate in the post period (or vice versa).  This criterion eliminates 20 observations but does not 
materially affect our results.  We then use beta level estimates over the three periods to create 
proxies for changes in firms’ cost of capital (i.e., shocks) as a result of the Enron events.  We 
define the initial shock (INIT_SHOCK) as the difference between the event beta in (B3) and the 
pre-event beta: INIT_SHOCK = BETA_EVT - BETA_PRE.  Recalling that BETA_EVT is the 
peak of the quadratic beta estimate, the initial shock metric captures the extent to which a firm’s 
systematic risk increases during the Enron crisis.  We define the remaining shock 
(REM_SHOCK) as the difference between the pre-report beta and the pre-event beta, i.e., 
REM_SHOCK = BETA_REM - BETA_PRE.  The remaining shock captures the extent to which -23- 
a firm’s systematic risk continues to be elevated after the Enron crisis and the firm’s immediate 
responses, but before the 10-K is filed. 
Table 2, Panel A, provides descriptive statistics for the parameter estimates, systematic 
risk and the beta shocks based on Window 1.  The average pre-event beta for the sample firms is 
0.670 (and close to 1 computing a value-weighted average).  The shock variables exhibit 
considerable cross-sectional variation and a reasonable parameter range.  As the average (value-
weighted) beta for the economy is by definition equal to 1 at any given point in time, it is 
expected that the average shock is relatively close to zero.  Nevertheless, firms with negative 
beta shocks may experience an increase in the cost of capital if the equity risk premium 
increases.  Regardless, the beta shocks provide an appropriate cross-sectional ranking. 
Panel B reports the average initial shock (INIT_SHOCK) and the average remaining 
shock (REM_SHOCK) by 2-digit SIC industry code and the proportions of positive observations 
in each industry.  The industries with the largest initial shocks are Furniture (SIC 25), Building 
products (SIC 15), and Auto dealers/gas stations (SIC 55).  Industries that have a high proportion 
(i.e., greater than 80%) of firms with positive remaining shocks are Furniture (SIC 25), 
Building/Construction (15), Personal services (72), Apparel (SIC 23), Oil and gas extraction 
(SIC 13), Motion Pictures (78), and Water transportation (SIC 44).  In the Appendix, we further 
characterize the shock variables and conduct various validity checks. 
4.   Analysis of disclosure responses to the cost of capital shocks 
4.1   Main results 
The first analysis relates the percentage changes in the 10-K page count to the cost of 
capital shocks.  We implement the following specification of the general model in equation (1): -24- 
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We estimate the model including either the initial shock (INIT_SHOCK) or the 
remaining shock (REM_SHOCK).  Based on Section 2, we predict a positive association 
between the initial shock or the remaining shock and the percent change in pages.
15 
We include the pre-event beta (BETA_PRE) to account for the possibility that firms with 
higher pre-period systematic risk are simply more responsive.  In addition, we include control 
variables for commonly cited determinants of disclosure such as firm size, performance, leverage 
and financing needs (Lang and Lundholm, 2000; Leuz and Wysocki, 2008).  The proxies for 
these constructs are the natural log of total assets at December 31, 2000 (LASSETS2000); return 
of operating income on average assets for the year ended December 31, 2000 (ROA2000); the 
debt-equity ratio at December 31, 2000, which is the book value of long-term debt scaled by the 
market value of equity plus the book value of long-term debt and preferred shares 
(DERATIO2000); the market-book ratio at December 31, 2000 (MB2000) where observations with 
a negative book value of equity are set to missing; and the ratio of property, plant and equipment, 
net, to total assets (PPE/TA2000) as a proxy for capital intensity.  An extended model also 
includes changes in several of these variables from 2000 to 2001.  All models include industry-
fixed effects based on one-digit SIC codes and a separate indicator variable for firms in Enron-
related industries (defined as SIC2 equal to 13, 29 or 49). 
Table 3, Panel A presents results for eight model specifications.  As the Enron shock is 
likely to affect firms in an industry similarly, our inferences are based on standard errors that are 
                                                 
15 The relation between the initial shock and 10-K disclosure changes may be attenuated if firms address the shocks 
in the interim. This issue, which does not arise for the remaining shock, is discussed in more detail in Section 5. -25- 
clustered at the two-digit SIC level.
16  The results for models (1) - (4), which include the initial 
shock variable and four variations of control variables, show a positive and significant relation 
between the initial shock (INIT_SHOCK) and the percentage change in the page count of the 10-
K.  The results for models (5) - (8), which include the remaining shock variable and four 
variations of control variables, show that the relation between the remaining shock 
(REM_SHOCK) and page count changes also is significantly positive.  These results are robust 
to alternative sets of control variables.  In particular, the results are similar and the inferences the 
same if we use the market value in computing firm size, employ contemporaneous, rather than 
lagged controls, and include only changes in the control variables in the model. 
The positive associations for the initial and remaining shock with the disclosure changes 
in the 10-K are consistent with our hypotheses and the notion that firms’ disclosures reduce their 
cost of capital.  Although we do not make ex-ante predictions about the control variables, the 
results are consistent across all eight models and accord with our intuition.  Firms with higher 
pre-event period betas, deteriorating operating performance, and with greater and growing firm 
size increase their 10-K disclosures more. 
Standard computations of the marginal effect of the cost of capital shock on 10-K page 
changes from Models 2 and 4 suggest that an initial shock (or remaining shock) equal to the 
inter-quartile range of the pre-event beta is associated with an increase in 1.2 pages, which is 2% 
of the median number of 10-K pages.  While this effect may appear small, we emphasize that 
judging the increase against the total number of pages may not be appropriate because the 10-K 
contains many pages that are boilerplate and hence uninformative.  Thus, a 2% increase in the 
page count could represent a substantial increase in relevant information to investors.  In fact, as 
                                                 
16 Alternatively, we cluster our standard errors by auditor and obtain very similar inferences. -26- 
a percentage, the page increase is much larger if we gauge it against key (or relevant) subsections 
of the 10-K (e.g., DISCUSS2001, FS2001 in Table 1) or compute the marginal effect for key 
subsections (e.g.,  FS %Δ  in Table 3, Panel B).  Moreover, the beta shocks are likely to be quite 
noisy, which could substantially attenuate the coefficient magnitudes.  To gauge the effect of 
measurement error on the coefficients, we follow common practice and run reverse regressions, 
essentially switching the independent and dependent variables.  These regressions (not tabulated) 
suggest that a 10% change in beta alone could explain the average page change in our sample.  
Thus, there are several pieces of evidence suggesting that the disclosure changes we observe are 
economically significant.
17 
We next analyze the determinants of page count increases in specific sections of the 10-K 
that are likely to contain important relevant disclosures:  MDA %Δ ,  FS %Δ ,  DISCUSS %Δ  and 
%R E L _ P A R Δ (see Section 3.3 for details).  Table 3, Panel B, presents the results for models of 
these four disclosure change variables on the initial shock (INIT_SHOCK) or the remaining 
shock (REM_SHOCK) and the levels of the same control variables and industry dummies as in 
Panel A (Model 2).
18  We find that the initial shock is positively associated with the page count 
changes for all four disclosure variables but the relation is statistically significantly for  FS %Δ  
only.  However, the coefficients are still fairly close to the coefficient on the initial shock in 
Panel A (Model 2) and, for  MDA %Δ  and  DISCUSS %Δ , the p-values of the coefficients are 
close to conventional significance levels, suggesting that the reduced sample size and lack of 
power account for the drop in significance.  The remaining shock is significantly associated with 
three of the four disclosure changes, i.e.,  FS %Δ ,  DISCUSS %Δ  and %R E L _ P A R Δ . 
                                                 
17 In addition, we document in Section 6 that firms’ disclosure changes are associated with economically significant 
beta declines (and also abnormal volume reactions around the 10-K filings). 
18 The results are similar but stronger when we use model 1 and weaker but consistent when we include changes in 
the control variables (model 3). -27- 
Next, we estimate the same models as in Table 3 using the percentage change in the word 
count of the earnings announcement in 2001 relative to 2000 (%ΔWORDS) as our disclosure 
response variable.  In these regressions, the cost of capital shocks do not exhibit a positive 
relation, are generally insignificant and the p-values are often far from conventional significance 
levels.  For brevity, we do not tabulate these results.  We subject the word count proxy to 
numerous refinements, e.g., we adjust the word counts for the occurrence of unusual corporate 
events and by industry; we convert the percentage changes into a simple variable indicating 
increases, decreases and approximately no change in the size of the earnings announcement; we 
focus on large changes only, drop small earnings announcements (< 500 words), and use log 
changes.  These refinements do not change the conclusion that the shocks do not exhibit a 
positive association.  Thus, it does not appear that noise in the earnings announcement proxy 
generates this (non-)result.  While we are cautious about interpreting this finding, it is possible 
that earnings announcements are simply not well suited to address the transparency concerns that 
arose from the Enron collapse.  They tend to be rather brief and they are not audited or subject to 
the same enforcement as official SEC filings.  Another (but more minor) issue is that firms’ 
earnings announcements and our pre-report beta estimation may overlap, which could result in 
confounding effects. 
4.2   Robustness tests 
We subject the results in the previous section to a large battery of robustness tests to 
address a number of potential concerns.  First, in an effort to rule out spurious correlations as an 
explanation for the results, we examine whether the initial shock and remaining shock variables 
have any explanatory power for the percent change in page counts from 1999 to 2000.  They do 
not; the coefficients of interest in these “placebo” regressions are close to zero, as they should be. -28- 
Second, in Panel C of Table 3, we address a number of concerns about the use of betas to 
measure cost of capital shocks.  For brevity, we report only the key coefficients of interest, but 
the models include the full set of control variables from Models 2 and 6 in Panel A.  In the first 
model, we use beta shocks derived from a linear market model.  While quadratic beta estimates 
over the event period are conceptually preferred and better suited for our setting (e.g., to capture 
interim responses), we obtain similar results using linear beta estimates, which is reassuring.
19 
Another potential concern is that beta estimates for infrequently traded stocks are 
downward biased (Scholes and Williams, 1977).  As a result, the estimated beta shocks may in 
part reflect differences in liquidity, which matters because liquidity and corporate disclosure are 
known to be related (e.g., Welker, 1995; Healy et al., 1999; Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000).  To 
address this potential issue, we examine the relation between %ΔPAGES and the two beta 
shocks for the subsample of stocks with a share price above $5 as they are less likely to have 
non-synchronous returns.  As reported in Panel C, the $5 restriction reduces the sample size to 
1,387 observations, but the results are very similar and the inferences are the same (see Model 
2).  The results are also robust to controlling for the log of average daily volume as a proxy for 
the downward bias in the beta estimates (not tabulated).
20 
Next, we address the concern that changes in the market’s expectations about future cash 
flows as a result of the Enron scandal or the September 11 terrorist attacks unduly affect our 
findings.  By using changes in beta, rather than abnormal returns, we should in principle separate 
cost of capital changes and updated assessments of future cash flows.  Furthermore, our primary 
                                                 
19 See Kumar et al. (2008) for a similar analysis of pre- and post-event betas using a linear market model. 
20 Another way to gauge the issue is to analyze the correlation between the residuals from the switching regime 
model and volume.  This analysis (untabulated) reveals that the correlation is on average small, approximately 5-6%, 
with approximately 20-30% of the correlations being significant and positive and 5-15% of the correlations being 
significant and negative.  The correlations are similar across the pre-event, event, and pre-report periods.  -29- 
sample excludes firms that potentially had severe cash flow shocks due to the September 11 
terrorist attacks.  Nevertheless, we include the revision in the analysts’ consensus forecast for 
next year’s earnings, computed from August 2001 to December 2001, as a proxy for changes in 
cash flow expectations.  The coefficient estimate on this variable is significantly negative, 
indicating that firms with larger downward revisions provide more disclosures.  However, 
controlling for the forecast revisions does not alter our inferences for the beta shocks and, more 
importantly, including this proxy for changes in cash flow expectations does not attenuate the 
coefficients on INIT_SHOCK and REM_SHOCK as it would if our results were primarily driven 
by changes in cash flow expectations.
21 
Model 4 in Panel C includes a control variable for idiosyncratic return volatility to 
address the concern that (a) the quadratic beta model insufficiently separates systematic and 
idiosyncratic components of risk and (b) that stocks with higher volatility are simply also more 
responsive in their disclosures.  We measure idiosyncratic volatility as the standard deviation of 
the residual from a linear market model over the pre-event period.  The results are similar and the 
inferences the same if we use raw volatility over the pre-event period or idiosyncratic volatility 
over the event period as controls. 
We also perform several robustness checks related to specific variable definitions (results 
not tabulated).  First, we adjust the changes in page count and word count for the existence of 
events that may reflect a fundamental change in the firm’s operations during the period that is 
correlated with both its beta and its required disclosures.  For example, discontinued operations 
may be associated with changes in systematic risk and it is likely to be associated with changes 
in page counts given the SEC disclosure requirements associated with discontinued operations.  
                                                 
21 This result also holds if we use the two-year ahead consensus forecast revision, rather than next year’s revision.  
Simply controlling for analyst following does not alter our findings or inferences either. -30- 
Our reviews of financial statements as well as SEC disclosure requirements suggest that the 
existence of the following irregular items (IRREGITEM) in the current year and two previous 
years can affect the length of the financial statements:  discontinued operations, new segments, 
extraordinary items, accounting changes, certain special items (specifically litigation reserves or 
restructuring charges), and acquisition activity.  We create seven indicator variables equal to one 
if the firm has evidence of these events based on Compustat data for the three years 1999, 2000, 
and 2001.  We regress the changes in the page count on these indicator variables and use the 
residuals from the following model (firm subscripts omitted) as dependent variable in our 
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While these adjustments provide a useful sensitivity check, it is a priori not obvious that 
the adjusted proxies dominate the unadjusted page (or word) changes.  The transparency 
concerns after Enron and the cost of capital shocks may have induced firms to make decisions 
that would result in such items.  For instance, “coming clean” on certain transactions is likely to 
result in extraordinary or special items.  Nevertheless, our results are unaffected by these 
adjustments.  That is, the positive association between the cost of capital shocks and the page 
changes continues to be significant and, more importantly, the coefficients of key interest are not 
materially altered, indicating that unusual corporate events and fundamental changes in the firm 
are not responsible for our findings. 
Finally, we include controls for past performance, specifically for past losses as they may 
trigger additional language in firms’ earnings announcements and 10-K filings (Li, 2008).   
Models (2) and (6) already include both ROA2000 and other models in Panel A of Table 3 include -31- 
the change in ROA from 2000 to 2001.  But given that operating performance generally lags 
stock returns, we expand these models to include the cumulative stock return over the pre-event 
period, the event or the pre-report period.  In addition, we include an indicator variable for loss 
firms (in 2001 and, alternatively, 2000).  The results are robust to the inclusion of these variables 
and the inferences remain the same. 
4.3   Cross-sectional analysis of the 10-K responses 
In this section, we present a cross-sectional analysis of firms’ 10-K responses.  As noted 
previously, we predict cross-sectional variation in the expected benefits to expanding the 10-K 
disclosures, which should lead to cross-sectional variation in firms’ disclosure responses.   
Exploiting this cross-sectional heterogeneity should improve identification and increase the 
confidence in our earlier findings. 
We argue in Section 2 that we expect the strongest disclosure response for firms that have 
high external financing needs and larger growth opportunities.  These firms are more likely to be 
sensitive to shocks to their cost of capital as they are expected to be more frequently accessing 
capital markets.  We also expect firms with positive shocks to respond more strongly, as the cost 
savings to decreasing disclosure may be small, and disclosure decreases may in fact increase 
expected litigation costs. 
Therefore, we estimate our main page change model separately for firms with positive 
shocks and a high sensitivity to cost of capital shocks vs. the (residual) sample of firms that have 
either a negative shock or low financing needs.  This specification allows the control variables to 
vary across subsamples and hence is more general than an interaction term.  We use two proxies 
to identify firms that are more likely to be sensitive to cost of capital shocks because they have 
high financing needs: 1) Firms with an above-median investment cash flow during fiscal 2001 -32- 
scaled by total assets, and 2) firms with an above-median difference between the average growth 
rate over two years and the maximum growth rate that can be financed by internal funds.   
Following Demirgüc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998), we compute the maximum internally-
financed growth as ROA/(1–ROA).  We consider alternative partitioning variables for firms’ 
financing needs and growth opportunities, e.g., splitting by the market-to-book ratio, and obtain 
similar results.  There are 946 (820) observations with a positive initial (remaining) shock and 
922 (1,048) observations with a negative one.  We do not have data for the financing needs 
variables for all firms and hence have fewer observations than in Table 3.  All models include the 
same control variables as specifications (2) and (6) in Table 3.  The coefficients for the control 
variables are not presented to conserve table space. 
Table 4, Panel A presents the cross-sectional results for %ΔPAGES.  Columns (1) 
through (4) present results using above-median investment cash flow to identify firms that are 
more sensitive to positive cost of capital shocks.  Columns (5) through (8) present results using 
above-median external financing needs to identify high-sensitivity firms.  The coefficient 
estimates on INIT_SHOCK in models (1), (2) and (6) are significant at the 10% level or better.  
The coefficient estimate on REM_SHOCK is significant in model (7).  More importantly, the 
coefficients on the shock variables, INIT_SHOCK and REM_SHOCK, for the group with 
positive shocks and high financing needs are much larger in magnitude than either the 
coefficients for the residual group or the coefficients on the shocks in Panel A of Table 3.  We 
test whether the differences in the coefficients on the shocks are statistically significant across 
the two subsamples and can reject the null hypothesis for models (7) and (8).  For models (1) and 
(2), the p-value is close to conventional significance levels (0.14), especially when considering 
that we cluster our standard errors at the industry level and hence draw conservative inferences. -33- 
In Panel B, we report the same model specifications for the page changes in the MD&A.  
We observe the same patterns for the coefficients on  MDA %Δ  as for the 10-K page changes.  
That is, the estimated coefficient on  MDA %Δ  for firms with positive shocks and high financing 
needs exceeds the respective coefficient for the residual group in all cases.  With the exception of 
the first model, the shock coefficients and their differences are not statistically significant but 
their magnitudes far exceed those in Panel B of Table 3, suggesting that the small sample size 
and hence lack of power are primarily responsible for the low t-statistics. 
On November 29, 2001, the SEC expanded its investigation to include Enron’s auditor, 
Arthur Andersen LLP (AA).  The audit firm was indicted for obstruction of justice in 2002 and 
eventually went out of business as a result of the Enron collapse.  We predict that AA clients are 
more likely to experience shocks to their cost of capital because of concerns over AA’s 
credibility and hence are more likely to respond by increasing their disclosure.
22  Consistent with 
this expectation, Panel C shows that AA clients exhibit larger coefficients on the initial shock 
using %ΔPAGES, %ΔΜDA and %ΔREL_PAR.  The difference in the coefficients between AA 
clients and non-AA clients is statistically significant for the 10-K page changes and the related 
party disclosure changes. 
In a final set of cross-sectional tests (untabulated), we drop the beta shocks and the pre-
event beta from the models in Panel A of Table 4 and re-estimate the page change models 
splitting the sample into firms with high and low financing needs.  We then compare the 
constants across the subsamples.  The idea behind this analysis is to test whether firms that ex 
ante are predicted to be more affected by the Enron shock do in fact increase their disclosures 
                                                 
22 As discussed in Ball (2009), the Enron scandal was a more severe blow to the credibility of AA audit clients than 
prior financial reporting scandals had been for other audit firms because AA’s reputation was already tarnished by 
prior scandals including Waste Management and Sunbeam, and because there were allegations that the Enron audit 
deficiencies involved top level management at AA and not just individuals. -34- 
more than other firms.  This analysis does not rely on the beta shocks and is merely built on the 
premise that the Enron scandal posed an exogenous transparency shock.  We find that firms with 
larger financing needs, as measured by the same proxies as in Panel A, exhibit significantly 
larger disclosure increases, which supports our inferences. 
5.  Analysis of the role of interim disclosures 
In this section, we analyze the relation between the cost of capital shocks and firms’ 
interim disclosure responses.  First, we include proxies for firms’ interim disclosures as controls 
in our 10-K page changes regressions.  We use changes in 8-K filings, conference call activity, 
the length of the earnings announcement as well as a summary measure of the firm’s response to 
the Enron shock derived from the regime switching model, i.e., the parameter estimate for  2 ˆ
i b .  If 
interim disclosures and 10-K filings are complements, we expect a positive relation between the 
interim disclosure and the 10-K page changes.  Moreover, introducing the interim disclosures 
should strengthen the relation between the remaining shock and the 10-K page response if the 
two disclosures are complements because the decline in beta due to the interim disclosure occurs 
with the expectation that firms still respond at the 10-K.  Thus, controlling for the interim 
disclosures should help the relation between REM_SHOCK and %ΔPAGES. 
We expand Models (2) and (6) from Table 3 to include proxies for the four interim 
disclosure proxies.  Table 5 reports the results from these regressions.  Models (1) and (2) 
include Δ8KCOUNT and Models (3) and (4) include ΔCALL.  The coefficient estimates on 
INIT_SHOCK and REM_SHOCK are comparable to Table 3 and remain significant in both 
cases.  The change in the number of 8-K filings is positively associated with the percentage 
change in 10-K pages.  The association between the change in the number of conference calls 
and the change in the 10-K page counts is negative but not significant.  Models (5) and (6) -35- 
include the percent change in word count in the annual earnings announcement (%ΔWORDS).  
The association between this change and the change in the 10-K page count is positive but again 
not significant.  This result is consistent with our earlier analyses relating changes in firms’ 
earnings announcements to the beta shocks and suggests that changes in earnings announcements 
are not suited to address investors’ transparency concerns as a result of the Enron collapse. 
Model (7) includes the  2 ˆ
i b  parameter from the regime-switching model as a proxy for 
firms’ immediate responses to the initial shock and, hence, we estimate this model for the 
remaining shock only.  As illustrated in Figure 1,  2 ˆ
i b  captures the direction of the beta shock and 
the curvature of quadratic event beta.  One explanation for this curvature is that a firm has 
responded to the initial shock, for example, through interim disclosures or other actions that 
enhance a firm’s credibility, such as a change in dividend policy.  In this sense,  2 ˆ
i b  is a summary 
measure of a firm’s responses to the initial shock and should capture the effects of all actions the 
firm takes during the event period, regardless of whether we can separately identify or measure 
them.  The downside of this measure, however, is that  2 ˆ
i b  may also capture changes in the cost 
of capital unrelated to a firm’s actions, including recoveries in the cost of capital due to 
information transfers from other firms.  However, as long as these other changes are not 
systematically biased, they should introduce only noise into our analysis. 
The percent change in 10-K pages has a positive and significant association with  2 ˆ
i b , 
indicating that there are complementarities between a firm’s immediate responses to the shock 
and the disclosure response in the 10-K filing.  Moreover, including  2 ˆ
i b significantly increases 
the coefficient on REM_SHOCK (using a Chow test), which is expected if interim responses and 
the 10-K are complements. -36- 
Next, we directly examine the relation between firms’ interim disclosure responses and 
the cost of capital shocks.  Table 6 is the analog to the analysis of the 10-K responses in Table 3 
using the two immediate disclosure responses as dependent variables.  Model (1) in Table 6 
shows that the association between changes in firms’ 8-K filings and the initial shock is positive 
and significant, suggesting that firms respond to the shock with the release of 8-K filings.  As the 
measurement of the change in 8-K filings and the event period overlap, we re-run the model 
measuring the change in 8-K filings starting in the middle of the event period (i.e., November 8), 
so that the shock is measured largely before the disclosure response.  Again, the association 
between the shock and the 8-K response is positive and significant.  Next, to see whether the 
additional 8-K filings help mitigate the cost of capital shocks, we restrict the change in 8-K 
filings to those that occur over the second-half of the event period, i.e., after the peak of the event 
period beta and up to the start of the pre-event period (i.e., December 6, 2001).  Model (2) shows 
that the coefficient on REM_SHOCK is negative and significant, consistent with the idea that 
immediate 8-K responses mitigate the initial shock.
23 
Models (3) and (4) perform the same tests for the change in the number of conference 
calls.  We do not find a positive association with the initial shock, but the coefficient on the 
remaining shock is negative and close to conventional significance levels (p=0.185, two-sided), 
which is consistent with the results for the 8-K findings.  Moreover, the latter association is 
significantly negative at the 1% level if we use changes in the conference calls over the entire 
event window, i.e., from October 15 to December 6, 2001.
24 
                                                 
23 We also confirm that the decline in the beta from the event period peak to the pre-report beta is significantly 
related to the change in 8-K filings. 
24 We also estimate seemingly unrelated regressions using both interim disclosure variables simultaneously to 
account for dependencies among them and obtain the same inferences. -37- 
Models (5) and (6) estimate the relation between the interim disclosure responses and the 
2 ˆ
i b  parameter from the regime switching model to see whether the curvature in the quadratic 
event beta is indeed related to firms’ interim responses.  Models (5) and (6) show a positive 
association for both interim disclosures, consistent with the idea that the curvature reflects 
among other things firms’ immediate responses, but the relation is significant only for the 
additional 8-K filings.  The weaker findings for the conference calls could stem from the fact that 
they are purely voluntary and not subject to SEC review. 
Taken together, the results in Tables 5 and 6 suggest that some firms respond 
immediately to the cost of capital shocks and that these interim responses are complements to 
10-K disclosures.  The results also highlight that using a quadratic beta estimate during the event 
period is an important feature of our analysis.  We intentionally define the event period to be 
long enough to capture the series of Enron-related events that led to the transparency crisis.  
However, an extended event period increases the likelihood of confounding events, in particular, 
due to firms’ responses to the initial shock.  Our regime-switching model addresses this issue by 
being flexible enough to capture these interim responses in the beta estimation. 
6.   Analysis of market reactions to 10-K filings 
In our final set of analyses, we examine whether firms’ disclosure changes have 
subsequent market reactions and whether they address mitigate the cost of capital shocks.   
Finding such reactions would corroborate the results for firms’ interim disclosures in Table 6 and 
address the concern that firms simply increase disclosures to reduce litigation risk or to thwart 
future regulation but do not provide information that is useful to investors.  In relating changes in 
disclosure to subsequent changes in the cost of capital, the tests in this section are similar to -38- 
those in traditional disclosure studies, except that the disclosure changes in our study are induced 
by an exogenous information-related shock.  
We analyze both post 10-K filing changes in systematic risk and short-window abnormal 
volume responses to the 10-K filing.  We begin with the beta response.  We define the beta 
response (BRESPONSE) as the change in systematic risk from the event period to the post-filing 
period.  We estimate the post-filing period beta (BETA_POST) after the annual report season 
from May 1, 2002 to August 31, 2002 using a standard market model.  Thus, BRESPONSE = 
BETA_EVT - BETA_POST.  A positive value of the beta response variable suggests a greater 
recovery of the beta relative to the peak level of systematic risk during the event period.  We are 
able to estimate BRESPONSE for 1,797 observations. 
The measure of abnormal volume is a firm-specific measure (Asthana et al., 2004) that 
has been applied specifically in the context of 10-K filings.  We define abnormal volume 
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t VOL  represents daily trading volume for firm i on day t.  Consistent with Asthana et al. 
(2004), we define the non-filing period as the 45-day window from 49 days before to five days 
before the 10-K filing date.  We measure the mean (μ) and standard deviation (σ) of daily trading 
volume for each firm i over this non-filing period and compute abnormal volume for a five-day 
event window around the 10-K filing date (-1,+3). 
Table 7, Panel A presents the analysis for the beta response using various combinations 
of control variables.  We use firm characteristics that are usually related to the cost of capital, -39- 
such as size, the market-to-book ratio and leverage as controls (in both levels and changes).  We 
find that the percentage change in the 10-K page is significantly related to the decline in beta for 
all three models.  Gauging the magnitude of the effects suggests that the mean page increase is 
associated with a 5% decline in beta.  These findings are consistent with the interpretation that 
the 10-K disclosure responses are useful to investors and alleviate the beta shocks. 
Table 7, Panel B presents the analysis of abnormal volume.  The models include control 
variables consistent with Asthani et al. (2004).  In particular, we control for last year’s abnormal 
volume response to the 10-K to ensure that any effect for %ΔPAGES stems indeed from the 
increase in pages and not a cross-sectional difference in firms’ volume responses to the 10-K.  
Furthermore, we include a control variable capturing the delay in the filing of the 10-K, which 
Asthana et al. (2004) document as being related to the abnormal volume response.  We find that 
the %ΔPAGES is significantly related to the abnormal volume reaction in all three models.  This 
finding is consistent with the interpretation that the additional disclosures in the 10-K are 
informative to investors and hence lead to greater turnover at the filing of the 10-K. 
7.   Conclusions 
In this paper, we analyze the relation between disclosure and the cost of capital using an 
exogenous, information-related cost of capital shock created by the Enron scandal in Fall 2001.  
We begin with tests that have the opposite structure of the typical research design.  In reversing 
the tests and using an exogenous shock, we mitigate endogeneity concerns in traditional cross-
sectional disclosure studies, especially with respect to omitted factors that jointly determine 
firms’ disclosure choices and their cost of capital.  Our analysis is based on an event-study 
technique that allows us to estimate shocks to firms’ betas as well as accommodate subsequent 
changes in beta due to firms’ interim responses to the transparency crisis. -40- 
Our analysis shows that beta shocks around the Enron scandal are associated with 
increased disclosure.  Firms expand the number of pages of their annual 10-K filings, notably the 
sections containing the narrative disclosures like the MD&A and related-party transactions as 
well as the financial statements and footnotes.  The increase in disclosure is particularly 
pronounced for firms that have positive cost of capital shocks and larger financing needs and for 
firms that have larger credibility issues.  We also find that firms respond with additional interim 
disclosures (e.g., 8-K filings), which have an immediate impact on the firm’s cost of capital.  We 
document that the 10-K disclosures are complementary to the interim disclosures; firms provide 
them even though the interim disclosures already reduce the beta shock.  Finally, we show that 
firms’ 10-K disclosure responses have significant subsequent market reactions (e.g., abnormal 
volume) and are effective in reducing the cost of capital shocks. 
These results complement prior disclosure studies by explicitly linking information-
related cost of capital shocks to firms’ disclosure responses.  In doing so, we increase the 
empirical support for the fundamental link between disclosure and firms’ cost of capital.  Our 
study also provides novel evidence that firms respond to shocks to the credibility of their 
financial reports.  This evidence is important as it shows that firms can mitigate the impact of a 
wider transparency crisis and that firm-specific disclosures can influence the cost of capital.  We 
emphasize, however, that this result should not be used to justify additional disclosure 
requirements as firms that voluntarily responded more to the cost of capital shock were those 
with the greatest hypothesized benefits. -41- 
Appendix 
Section A.1 describes Enron-related events between October 16, 2001 and January 26, 
2002.  From these, we identify seven potential sets of pre-event – event – pre-report windows 
that are outlined in Section A.2.  The final section of the Appendix reports the results of an ex 
post analysis of the beta estimates over the various windows to assess their validity. 
A.1 Event dates related to Enron 
We identify potentially significant events from published timelines of the Enron scandal 
(e.g., Platts, 2002; Washington Post, 2002), and from independent searches of news reports.  
Potentially important event dates in the context of our study are those that changed investors’ 
prior beliefs about the likelihood or magnitude of private information about the sample firm. 
We identify three types of event dates.  First, we identify six Enron-specific events that 
are also indicators that financial reporting or corporate governance problems may be widespread. 
Oct. 16:  Enron first announces its huge losses and hints of conflict-of-interest problems with its 
partnerships. 
Oct.22:  Enron announces that the SEC has launched an inquiry.  
Oct 29:  The SEC moves its inquiry to DC signaling a higher likelihood of securities violations. 
Oct 31:  The SEC initiates a formal investigation. 
Nov 8:  Enron restates earnings back to 1997. 
Nov 29:  The SEC’s investigation is expanded to include Arthur Andersen LLP. 
These events are specific to Enron, but they are not necessarily the most significant for 
Enron based on an analysis of its stock returns.  This set does not include events such as a credit 
rating downgrade of Enron’s debt or a takeover offer of Enron which are significant for Enron 
but unlikely (in our view) to have broad implications for information problems at other firms. 
Second, we identify events that directly indicate that the information problems at Enron 
are expected to be systemic. -42- 
Nov 19:  Representative John Dingell requests that the Public Oversight Board (POB) review 
Andersen’s audits of Enron 
Nov 29:  SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt calls pro forma earnings "unstructured and undisciplined" 
and suggests that the SEC is focusing attention on misleading financial reporting.   
Dec 4:  The Big-five firms pledge to work together to address financial reporting problems. 
Jan. 7:  It is reported that the Big Five have petitioned the SEC to improve disclosure 
regulation. 
Jan 9:  The Senate Banking Committee, headed by Sen. Paul Sarbanes, announces its plans to 
hold a hearing Feb. 12 to examine accounting and investor protections.  The US Justice 
Department's fraud section also announces that it will form a special task force to 
examine the collapse of Enron. 
Third, we identify financial press discussions that suggest that the Enron scandal was not 
an isolated problem but rather an indicator of corporate transparency and corporate governance 
problems. 
Nov 5:  “What Enron’s Financial Reports Did – and Didn’t – Reveal --- Auditor Could Face 
Scrutiny on Clarity of Financial Reports” (Wall Street Journal, p. C1) 
Nov 8:  In a DJ Newswire column, the author speculates that Enron’s partnership accounting 
problems, which resulted in significant earnings restatements, could push the FASB to 
prioritize its projects on SPEs from having standards of ownership including 
provisions for minimum ownership by unaffiliated outsiders to control-based 
standards.  The article also questions Arthur Andersen’s responsibilities given the 
restatements. 
Nov 26:  Business Week cover story is “CONFUSED ABOUT EARNINGS? You're not alone.  
Here's what companies should do--and what investors need to know.”   
Jan 26:  “Trying not to be the next Enron, companies scrutinize practices” appears on p.1 of 
the New York Times Saturday business section.   
These articles are not events per se.  However, it is possible (or even likely) that the 
articles affected public opinion about the systemic nature of the transparency problem.  Existing 
research has shown that articles in the financial press do affect investor opinions (e.g., Foster, 
1979; Foster, 1987; Chang and Suk, 1998; Pruitt et al. 2000; Huberman and Regev, 2001).  It is 
also possible that the articles reflect public opinion rather than create it, which is another reason 
to search for and consider these dates.  We end our search for such articles in January 2001 
because that is the start of the earnings announcement season. -43- 
A.2 Identification of event windows 
Figure A1 shows the value-weighted and equal-weighted index from August 1, 2001 
through February 28, 2002 and provides some context for the window selection.  The figure 
illustrates the high volatility period associated with the September 11
th terrorist attacks.  The 
arrows point to the start dates and the end dates that we consider for the event period. 
Figure A1: Index returns 
 
We identify seven combinations of windows to estimate systematic risk for the pre-event 
period (BETA_PRE), the event period (BETA_EVT), and the pre-report period (BETA_REM).  
In the timelines below, T1 and T2 define the endpoints of the event period.  The center date of 
the event period is noted for each window.  In all scenarios, the end of the pre-event period is 
August 31, 2001.  There is a discontinuity between the end of the pre-event period and the 
beginning of the event period ranging from 44 to 62 days.  The discontinuity allows us to avoid -44- 
the week-long trading halt and subsequent high volatility period associated with September 11.  
In addition, the discontinuity is advantageous because the pre-event period is not contaminated 
when we do not properly identify the start of the event period.  The discontinuity does not affect 
the estimation procedure. 
Alternative Windows for the Beta Estimation 
 T1  T2 
  −−−−−−−β1−−−−−−    −−−−−−−−−β2−−−−−−−−−−  −−−−−−−−β3−−−−−−−− 
Window 1:    Nov  8   
 05/01/01–8/31/01    10/15/01–12/05/01  12/06/01 – 01/15/02 
 
Window 2:      Nov 12   
 05/01/01–8/31/01    10/19/01–12/05/01  12/06/01 – 01/15/02 
 
Window 3:      Nov 19   
 05/01/01–8/31/01    11/02/01–12/05/01  12/06/01 – 01/15/02 
 
Window 4:      Nov 27   
 05/01/01–8/31/01   10/15/01-01/10/02  1/11/02-01/28/02 
 
Window 5:      Nov 29   
 05/01/01–8/31/01   10/19/01–01/10/02  1/11/02-01/28/02 
 
Window 6:      Nov 20   
 05/01/01–8/31/01   10/15/01-12/31/01  1/01/02-01/28/02 
 
Window 7:      Nov 23   
 05/01/01–8/31/01   10/19/01–12/31/01  1/01/02-01/28/02 
 
We consider three start dates for the event window: October 15, October 19, and 
November 2, 2001.  October 15 is day t-1 relative to Enron’s announcement that it lost $618 
million, which provided the first indication of possible conflict-of-interest questions related to 
the Fastow-run partnerships and the “quality” of Enron’s prior-period earnings.  October 19 is 
trading day t-1 relative to Enron’s announcement of an SEC investigation of the partnerships and 
of suspicions by analysts that Enron will release additional bad news (October 22).  November 2 
is the start date that makes November 19 the center of the event window.  November 19 is 
significant because on that day it is first reported that Representative John Dingell requested that -45- 
the Public Oversight Board (POB) review Andersen’s audits of Enron (and Waste Management).  
The public oversight Board declines to review specific cases but indicates that it will consider a 
systemic review. 
We consider two end dates for the event window.  The end date in windows 1-3 is 
December 5, which is day t+1 relative to the pledge by the big-five firms to work together to 
address financial reporting problems, especially related to SPEs and market risks.  The event 
periods in these windows include all of the Enron-specific events and all but three of the 
systemic and financial press events.  The pre-report period begins December 6 and ends on 
January 15, 2002, which is the first percentile of fourth quarter earnings announcement dates. 
In windows 4 and 5, the event period extends to January 10, 2002, which is day t+1 
relative to the last systemic event and it includes all but the last financial press event.  Because of 
the longer event period, we are forced to extend the length of the pre-report period to January 28 
in order to have a sufficiently long pre-report period to estimate the model.  January 28 
represents the first quartile of earnings announcement dates.  In windows 6 and 7, we arbitrarily 
set the end of the event window at December 31, 2001.  This specification provides more 
equally-sized windows for the event-period and the pre-report period. 
A.3 Analysis of beta estimates 
We use beta estimates from window 1.
25  In choosing among the windows, the primary 
trade-off is that a longer event window, which is more inclusive of important events, 
                                                 
25 There is no ex-post diagnostic tool that establishes the best window.  Lockwood and Kadiyala (1988) estimate the 
model for every combination of event windows with a start date within 30 days prior to the one day event (T1) and 
an end date within 30 days after the event (T2).  The window (T1, T2 combination) that maximizes the log 
likelihood function is chosen as the best firm-specific model. However, they have firm-specific events whereas we 
have a common event to all firms. -46- 
mechanically shortens the pre-report window given that the report date (either the earnings 
announcement date or the 10-K date) is fixed. 
Several analyses favor the shorter event periods (windows 1-3).  The means (medians) of 
the adjusted R
2s from the model estimation are higher for these windows than for the other 
windows (although the differences are not significant).  Windows 1-3 also produce the smallest 
number of negative  1 ˆ
i b  estimates (regardless of the start date).  Finally, the residuals for windows 
1, 2 and 3 are mean zero during the pre-event period and the event period.  They are significantly 
positive during the pre-report period (at approximately the 10% level).  In windows 4-7, the 
residuals during the event (pre-report) period are positive (negative) and significant.  None of the 
analyses indicate a difference between windows 1-3.  Thus, we report results for the window that 
allows the earliest possible start date, i.e., window 1. 
The beta shocks estimated from window 1 have associations and exhibit cross-sectional 
variation that support their validity.  For example, the median initial shock for the 45 firms that 
have Enron-related 8-Ks is 0.21, which is significantly greater than the median initial shock for 
the remaining 2,056 firms of 0.006.  The median remaining shocks also are greater (0.18 vs. 
0.10), but the difference is not significant.  The median initial shocks for the Arthur Andersen 
clients are not significantly different (0.04 for AA clients vs. 0.005 for non-AA clients), but the 
remaining shocks are significantly higher by 0.043 at the 10% level.  This pattern is consistent 
with the fact that Arthur Andersen was not implicated in the scandal until later in the event 
window.  There is a significant positive correlation between the initial shock and firm size 
(measured either by market capitalization or total assets) and leverage (measured by the debt-
equity ratio).  There is a significant positive correlation between the remaining shock and firm 
size, leverage, and operating leverage (measured by the ratio of PPE/total assets), and a -47- 
significant negative correlation between analyst following and the initial shock.  This last result 
suggests that firms with ex ante better information environments have smaller shocks to the 
Enron-related transparency crisis. -48- 
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 Table 1 
Descriptive statistics on disclosure proxies and firm characteristics 
The sample comprises a maximum of 1,868 firms with a December 31 fiscal year end and sufficient data to estimate 
subsequent models. We eliminate airlines, insurance carriers, and firms that are majorly affected by the September 
11
th terrorist attacks. Panel A provides descriptive statistics for the disclosure proxies in our analyses. It presents 
counts of the number of pages for the entire 10-K in 2001 (PAGES2001); the management discussion and analysis 
(MDA2001) section (Item 7); the sum of Items 6 (Selected Financial Data), 8 (Financial Statements and 
Supplementary Data), and 15 (Exhibits, Financial Statement Schedules, and Reports on Form 8-K), which 
commonly include financial tables (FS2001); and the sum of Items 1 (Business), 2 (Properties), and 7 (MD&A), 
which commonly include narrative discussions about the firm (DISCUSS2001). We also present the percent changes 
(%Δ) in these variables relative to the year 2000.  We select the disclosures on related-party transactions from the 
10-K or the proxy statement. REL_PAR2001 is the number of pages of this section. %ΔREL_PAR is the percentage 
change in these pages counts from 2000 to 2001, after setting changes of plus or minus one page to zero. 
WORDS2001 is the word count for the fourth quarter and annual 2001 earnings announcement and %ΔWORDS is the 
percent change in the word count relative to the prior year. The preceding change variables are truncated at the 1
st 
and 99
th percentile, except %ΔPAGES, which is truncated at 2
nd and 98
th percentile. 8ΚCOUNT is the number of 8-
K filings between October 15, 2001 and March 31, 2002, but excluding filings related to the September 11
th terrorist 
attacks.  Δ8ΚCOUNT is the difference in the count over the same period in 2000, winsorized at +3 and –3. 
CONFCALL is the number of conference calls from October 15, 2001 to March 31, 2002. ΔCALL denotes the 
difference in the number of calls relative to the same period one year earlier, winsorized at +3 and –3. 
*** (†††) and * (†) indicate that the mean (median) change in the respective variable is significantly different from 
zero at the 1% and 10% level, respectively. 
Panel A: Disclosure proxies 
 N  Mean  Std  dev  p25  Median  p75 
10-K Page counts        
 PAGES2001 1,868  63.619  29.720  44  62  79 
 MDA2001 1,116  13.320  8.574  7  11  18 
  DISCUSS2001 1,163  26.693  13.793  17  25  34 
  FS2001 1,163  34.013  16.995  25  32  40 
 % Δ PAGES   1,868  16.6%***  31.5%  0.0%  9.0%†††  23.6% 
 % Δ MDA   1,116 38.7%***  44.7%  10.0%  30.4%†††  57.1% 
 % Δ DISCUSS   1,158 22.2%***  32.1%  3.7%  17.6%†††  35.0% 
 % Δ FS  1,145 17.6%***  56.6%  0.0% 8.0%†††  22.6% 
         
Proxy statement counts        
 REL_PAR2001 1441  4.822  9.003  0  1  4 
 % Δ REL_PAR  1312 19.4%***  99.5%  0  0  0 
         
EA Word counts         
 WORDS2001  1,788 2,003 1,262 1,197 1,706 2,446 
 % Δ WORDS 1,715  15.5%***  32.2%  -5.1%  9.0%†††  28.9% 
         
8-K counts         
 8KCOUNT  1,868 0.904  1.771  0  0  1 
  (without  Sept  11)  1,868  0.760  1.568  0  0  1 
         
  Δ8KCOUNT  1,868 0.052*  1.220  0  0  0 
  (without  Sept  11)  1,868  0.004  1.159  0  0  0 
         
Conference Call         
 CONFCALL  1,868  1.140  0.955  0  1  2 
 Δ CALL 1,868  -0.074***  0.642  0  0  0 
  
Table 1 (continued) 
Descriptive statistics on disclosure proxies and firm characteristics 
Panel B provides descriptive statistics on firm characteristics that we use as control variables in subsequent models. 
TOTASS is the book value of total assets (in millions). SIZE is the market value of common equity plus the book 
value of preferred stock and long-term debt (in millions). ROA is return on assets using the operating income after 
depreciation and amortization and scaling it by the average of total assets at the beginning and the end of the fiscal 
year. CUMRET is the cumulative return from May 1, 2001 to August 31, 2001. DERATIO is long-term debt scaled 
by total assets at the end of the fiscal year. MB is the market-to-book ratio of common shareholders’ equity, setting 
the ratio to zero for book value < 0. PPE/TA is the book value of net property, plant and equipment scaled by total 
assets. FCSTREV is the change in the mean (consensus) analyst forecast of next-fiscal-year annual earnings during 
the period from August 2001 to December 2001 scaled by price. FIRMRETVOL is the firm’s idiosyncratic risk 
during the pre-event period, where idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the residual from a linear market 
model that includes the CRSP value-weighted return on the market.  ABN_VOL is a firm-specific measure of 
abnormal volume computed as described in Section 6. All variables are reported for the fiscal year 2001 and 
truncated at the 1
th and 99
th percentile of the respective distribution. 
Panel B: Firm characteristics 
 N  Mean  Std  dev  p25  Median  p75 
          
 TOTASS  1,868 3,585.4  30,600.3 94.3  372.9  1,325.5 
 SIZE  1,864 3,389.3  19,644.6 99.5  371.0  1,383.1 
 ROA  1,842 -0.002 0.189  -0.020  0.032 0.097 
  CUMRET  1,837 0.032  0.300  -0.143  0.039  0.187 
  DERATIO   1,849 0.270  0.257  0.023  0.201  0.466 
 Μ Β   1,763 3.777  3.557  1.904  2.909  4.441 
  PPE_TA  1,828 0.238  0.235  0.049  0.158  0.354 
 FCSTREV  1,257  -0.011 0.045  -0.011  -0.001  0.000 
 FIRMRETVOL  1,867  0.035 0.021  0.020 0.030  0.045 
 ABN_VOL  1,480  0.105 0.724  -0.377  -0.110  0.352 Table 2 
Descriptive statistics on model parameter estimates, systematic risk and beta shocks 
Panel A reports descriptive statistics for the parameter estimates from the regime switching beta model in equations 
(B1) and (B2), measures of systematic risk over four time periods and the beta shocks. The pre-event period beta is 
equal to  1 ˆ
i b  (BETA_PRE). During the event period,  ) 1 ( ˆ ) 2 )( 1 ( ˆ ˆ ˆ
3 2 1 2 T t b T t t T b b i i i i − + − − + = β .  We compute the 
event period beta (BETA_EVT) at day t = 0. The pre-report period beta (BETA_REM) is  ) 1 2 ( ˆ ˆ ˆ
3 1 3 T T b b i i i − + = β . We 
report parameter and beta estimates choosing T1 and T2 according to Window 1 in Appendix A.2.  During the post-
report period, systematic risk (BETA_POST) is estimated using a market model from May 1, 2002 to August 31, 
2002.  The initial shock (INIT_SHOCK) is BETA_EVT - BETA_PRE.  The remaining shock (REM_SHOCK) is 
BETA_REM - BETA_PRE. 
Panel A: 
 N  Mean  Std  dev  p25  Median  p75 
Model parameters         
1 ˆ
i b   1,868  0.66684 0.6898 0.18972  0.53558  0.95633 
2 ˆ
i b   1,868  -0.00029 0.00268 -0.00168 -0.00021 0.00107 
3 ˆ
i b   1,868 0.002  0.02398 -0.00936 0.00289 0.01457 
         
Estimates of systematic risk         
BETA_PRE  1,868  0.66684 0.6898 0.18972  0.53558  0.95633 
BETA_EVT  1,868  0.59982 0.97357 -0.00566 0.54162 1.12409 
BETA_REM  1,868  0.74266 1.01538 0.08332 0.68691 1.27465 
BETA_POST  1,797  0.67755 0.47763 0.30236 0.67339 0.97329 
         
Estimates of shocks         
INIT_SHOCK  1,868  -0.06702 0.94982 -0.56727 -0.01294 0.42015 
REM_SHOCK  1,868  0.07582 0.91106 -0.35574 0.10998 0.55355 
         
  
Table 2 (continued) 
Descriptive statistics on model parameter estimates, systematic risk and beta shocks 
Panel B reports the means for the initial and the remaining shock by industry as well as the proportions of positive 
initial and remaining shocks in each industry.  We report only industries with more than 5 sample observations. 
Panel B: 
SIC    N  INIT_SHOCK  % POS  N  REM_SHOCK % POS 
25 Furniture  and  Fixtures  6  0.6402  0.8333  6  0.5301  0.8333 
55  Auto Dealers, Gas Stations  9  0.5488  0.7778  9  0.2675  0.7778 
15  Bldg Cnstr-Gen Contr, Op Bldr  10  0.5215  0.8000  10  0.3981  0.9000 
24  Lumber and Wood Pds, Ex Furn  7  0.4201  0.7143  7  0.1426  0.7143 
23  Apparel & Other Finished Pds  6  0.3861  0.6667  6  0.2990  0.8333 
72 Personal  Services  7  0.3260  0.5714  7  0.7008  1.0000 
57  Home Furniture & Equip Store  6  0.2949  0.6667  6  -0.3993  0.3333 
82 Educational  Services  6  0.2640  0.6667  6  0.1451  0.6667 
29  Pete Refining & Related Inds  8  0.2596  0.3750  8  -0.1416  0.7500 
34  Fabr Metal, Ex Machy, Trans Eq  29  0.2083  0.6207  29  0.2081  0.6552 
31  Leather and Leather Products  9  0.1957  0.6667  9  0.4491  0.7778 
40 Railroad  Transportation  6  0.1714  0.6667  6  0.2418  0.6667 
65 Real  Estate  20  0.1324  0.5500  20  0.1214  0.4500 
37 Transportation  Equipment  35  0.1151  0.6571  35  0.1690  0.5714 
49  Electric, Gas, Sanitary Serv  59  0.0988  0.5593  59  0.0746  0.4746 
20  Food and Kindred Products  36  0.0848  0.5278  36  0.0638  0.4722 
79 Amusements,  Recreation  16  0.0715  0.5000  16  0.1330  0.6250 
30  Rubber & Misc Plastics Prods  22  0.0622  0.6364  22  -0.1174  0.5455 
62  Security & Commodity Brokers  21  0.0618  0.6667  21  0.3465  0.7143 
61 Nondepository  Credit  Instn  17  0.0591  0.5294  17  0.5249  0.6471 
17 Construction-Special  Trade  6  0.0540  0.6667  6  -0.0408  0.3333 
64  Ins Agents, Brokers & Service  8  0.0471  0.3750  8  -0.0381  0.3750 
48 Communications  59  0.0398  0.5932  59  0.3605  0.6441 
27  Printing, Publishing & Allied  24  0.0311  0.5417  24  0.2801  0.7083 
58 Eating  and  Drinking Places  24  0.0205  0.4167 24  0.1284 0.7083 
60 Depository  Institutions  252  0.0162  0.5278  252  0.1332  0.6071 
67  Holding, Other Invest Offices  29  -0.0213  0.5862  29  0.0816  0.5517 
35  Indl,Comml Machy, Computer Eq  93  -0.0294  0.5807  93  -0.0468  0.5484 
80 Health  Services  39  -0.0440  0.4359  39  -0.2189  0.3590 
26  Paper and Allied Products  17  -0.0767  0.5882  17  0.1145  0.5294 
38  Meas Instr; PhotoGds; Watches  96  -0.0816  0.4167  96  -0.0812  0.4896 
32  Stone, Clay, Glass, Concrete Pd  15  -0.0823  0.5333  15  0.2790  0.7333 
39  Misc Manufacturing Industries  15  -0.0933  0.4667  15  -0.4003  0.4667 
33 Primary  Metal  Industries  27  -0.1140  0.3704  27  0.3667  0.6296 
36  Electr, Oth Elec Eq, Ex Cmp  113  -0.1332  0.4336  113  0.0753  0.5487 
13  Oil and Gas Extraction  71  -0.1358  0.4366  71  0.4118  0.8028 
73 Business  Services  217  -0.1411  0.4839  217  0.0467  0.5438 
50 Durable  Goods-Wholesale  49  -0.1631  0.4082  49  0.2468  0.5306 
47 Transportation  Services  6  -0.2330  0.3333  6  0.0114  0.5000 
51 Nondurable  Goods-Wholesale  22  -0.2421  0.4091  22  0.2576  0.6818 
28  Chemicals & Allied Products  163  -0.2812  0.4110  163  -0.2656  0.3742 
10 Metal  Mining  10  -0.2854  0.5000  10  0.3835  0.7000 
42  Motor Freight Trans, Warehouse  21  -0.2957  0.3810  21  0.1334  0.6667 
59 Miscellaneous  Retail  19  -0.3042  0.3684  19  0.0181  0.6842 
70  Hotels, Other Lodging Places  17  -0.3445  0.2941  17  -0.0311  0.5294 
87  Engr, Acc,Resh, Mgmt, Rel Svcs  53  -0.3662  0.3396  53  -0.3568  0.3208 
44 Water  Transportation  10  -0.4219  0.4000  10  0.3883  0.8000 
78 Motion  Pictures  6  -0.5024  0.5000  6  0.7753  1.0000 
16  Heavy Constr; not Bldg Cntractrs  8  -0.5086  0.2500  8  0.4448  0.5000 
22  Textile Mill Products  8  -0.7936  0.5000  8  0.0101  0.5000  
Figure 1 
Illustrations of the time-series patterns in the systematic risk estimates for the pre-event period, the event period, and the pre-report period for alternative values 
of  2 ˆ
i b .  Panels A through C illustrate levels of systematic risk in the case of a HIGH positive  2 ˆ
i b  (equals 0.100), a LOW positive  2 ˆ
i b  (equals 0.002), and a 
negative  2 ˆ
i b  (equals -0.002), respectively.  Within each panel, we present estimates of systematic risk in the pre-report period for five levels of  3 ˆ
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Table 3 
Relation between 10-K disclosure changes and cost of capital shocks 
The sample comprises a maximum of 1,868 firms with a December fiscal year end and sufficient data to estimate 
subsequent models. We eliminate airlines, insurance carriers, and firms that are majorly affected by the September 11
th 
terrorist attacks as described in Section 3. Panel A reports results for eight models regressing the percent change in page 
counts (%ΔPAGES) on combinations of initial shock (INIT_SHOCK), remaining shock (REM_SHOCK), pre-event beta 
(BETA_PRE), and control variables. LASSETS is natural log of total assets. ROA is the return on assets. DERATIO is 
long-term debt scaled by total assets. MB is the market-to-book ratio. PPE/TA is the book value of net PPE scaled by total 
assets. The control variables are measured as of fiscal year 2000. The changes in the control variables are measured from 
2000 to 2001, except in for the market-to-book ratio which uses the market values of equity.  The regression models 
include, wherever noted, industry-fixed effects based on one-digit SIC codes and a separate dummy for firms in Enron-
related industries (defined as SIC2 equal to 13, 29 or 49). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and based on standard 
errors that are clustered at two-digit SIC level. *** {**} (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided). 
Panel A: 
 Model  specification 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Constant  0.1072***  0.1015*  0.0697 0.1274***  0.1057***  0.1067**  0.0602 0.1173*** 
  (4.17) (1.92) (1.27) (3.02) (4.02) (2.03) (1.11) (2.93) 
INIT_SHOCK  0.0289***  0.0259***  0.0231***  0.0255***      
  (4.25)  (3.88)  (3.56)  (3.68)      
REM_SHOCK       0.0237***  0.0242***  0.0174*  0.0207** 
       (2.88)  (3.15)  (1.85)  (2.23) 
BETA_PRE  0.0501*** 0.0434**  0.0431** 0.0463***  0.0429*** 0.0368**  0.0359*  0.0401** 
  (3.21) (2.36) (2.27) (2.81) (2.80) (2.03) (1.87) (2.38) 
LASSETS2000  0.0055 0.0078**  0.0080**    0.0062 0.0085**  0.0092**   
  (1.19) (2.10) (2.29)    (1.32) (2.13) (2.30)   
ROA2000  0.0089 0.0006 -0.0524    0.0074 0.0006 -0.0515   
  (0.40) (0.03) (1.48)    (0.33) (0.03) (1.56)   
DERATIO2000  -0.0180 0.0017 0.0068    -0.0239 0.0014 0.0054   
  (0.54) (0.05) (0.19)    (0.74) (0.04) (0.15)   
MB2000    -0.0004*  -0.0006    -0.0003  -0.0006  
   (1.77)  (0.76)    (1.61)  (0.75)  
PPE/TA2000   0.0432  0.0433    0.0316  0.0337  
   (0.68)  (0.64)    (0.50)  (0.50)  
ΔASSETS     0.0573**  0.0506**     0.0607**  0.0544** 
     (2.15)  (2.03)     (2.35)  (2.24) 
ΔROA     -0.1826**  -0.1423*     -0.1718**  -0.1294 
     (2.40)  (1.71)     (2.29)  (1.54) 
ΔDERATIO     0.0217  0.0372     0.0179  0.0324 
     (0.29)  (0.52)     (0.24)  (0.46) 
ΔMB     0.0147  0.0177*     0.0151  0.0175* 
     (1.26)  (1.71)     (1.35)  (1.77) 
Industry  controls  NO YES YES YES  NO  YES YES YES 
          
Observations 1,868 1,793 1,687 1,707 1,868 1,793 1,687 1,707 
R-squared  0.0169 0.0245 0.0253 0.0236 0.0147 0.0237 0.0236 0.0218 
  
Table 3 (continued) 
Relation between 10-K disclosure changes and cost of capital shocks 
Panel B reports results for regression models of percent changes in page counts for three sections of the 10-K and one section from the proxy statement on 
combinations of initial shock (INIT_SHOCK), remaining shock (REM_SHOCK), pre-event beta (BETA_PRE), and control variables (described in Panel A).  
The percentage changes in the page counts refer to the management discussion & analysis (%ΔMDA), the sections that are generally narrative (%ΔDISCUSS) 
and the sections that include financial tables (%ΔFS).  See Table 1, Panel A for more details. The regression models include industry-fixed effects based on one-
digit SIC codes and a separate dummy for firms in Enron-related industries (defined as SIC2 equal to 13, 29 or 49). The t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
and based on standard errors that are clustered at two-digit SIC level. *** {**} (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided). 
Panel B: 
   Dependent  variable   
  %ΔMDA %ΔDISCUSS %ΔFS  %ΔREL_PAR %ΔMDA %ΔDISCUSS %ΔFS  %ΔREL_PAR 
Constant  0.3903*** 0.1394*** 0.0631  0.4637  0.3916*** 0.1325***  0.0791  0.4513 
  (3.49) (2.85)  (0.98) (1.56) (3.60) (2.72)  (1.23) (1.50) 
INIT_SHOCK 0.0166  0.0193  0.0343***  0.0343         
 (1.37)  (1.63)  (2.84)  (0.98)         
REM_SHOCK         0.0086  0.0181*  0.0492*  0.0473* 
         (0.62)  (1.88)  (1.70)  (1.72) 
BETA_PRE  0.0352 0.0149  0.0640**  0.0037 0.0278 0.0091  0.0594 0.0008 
  (1.37) (0.58)  (2.06) (0.07) (1.08) (0.38)  (1.62) (0.02) 
LASSETS2000 0.0110 0.0102  0.0108 -0.0065 0.0122 0.0108  0.0104 -0.0068 
  (1.23) (1.10)  (1.19) (0.38) (1.39) (1.30)  (0.98) (0.44) 
ROA2000  -0.0160  0.0611**  0.0172 -0.1202 -0.0184  0.0570*  0.0080 -0.1212 
  (0.35) (2.04)  (0.44) (1.15) (0.40) (1.97)  (0.21) (1.13) 
DERATIO2000 -0.1149** -0.0627 -0.0060  0.0448  -0.1185** -0.0625  0.0038  0.0500 
  (2.03) (1.31)  (0.08) (0.36) (2.01) (1.38)  (0.05) (0.39) 
MB2000  0.0000  -0.0003  -0.0009** 0.0008  0.0001  -0.0003  -0.0009** 0.0007 
  (0.07) (1.00)  (2.30) (0.21) (0.09) (1.06)  (2.27) (0.20) 
PPE/TA2000 -0.0176  -0.0989**  0.1003  -0.1234  -0.0224 -0.1074** 0.0819  -0.1428 
  (0.28) (2.02)  (1.03) (0.69) (0.36) (2.23)  (0.90) (0.80) 
Industry controls  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
           
Observations  1,069 1,109 1,096 1,257 1,069 1,109  1,096 1,257 
R-squared  0.0505 0.0411 0.0163 0.0107 0.0496 0.0405  0.0192 0.0114 
  
Table 3 (continued) 
Robustness analysis with respect to the beta shocks 
Robustness analysis of the results presented in Table 3.  All of the models regress the percent change in page counts (%ΔPAGES) on either the initial shock or 
remaining shock, the pre-event beta, and the control variables from Models (3) and (7) in Table 3.  In Model 1, INIT_SHOCK, REM_SHOCK, and the pre-event 
beta are estimated using coefficient estimates from a linear market model that includes the CRSP value-weighted return on the market, rather than from the 
quadratic model described in Table 2.  In Model 2, the sample excludes firms with a stock price at December 31, 2001 of less than $5.  In Model 3, we include an 
additional control variable that measures the change in the mean (consensus) analyst forecast of next-fiscal-year annual earnings during the period from August 
2001 to December 2001 scaled by price (FCSTREV).  In Model 4, we include an additional control variable that measures the firm’s idiosyncratic risk during the 
pre-event period (FIRMRETVOL).  Idiosyncratic risk is the standard deviation of the residual from the linear market model that includes the CRSP value-
weighted return on the market.  The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on standard errors that are clustered at the two-digit SIC level.  *** {**} 
(*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided). 
Panel C: 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
  Shocks computed using 
linear market-model betas 
Sample excludes stocks with 
price < $5 
Model includes control for 
analyst forecast revision 
activity  
Model includes control for 
idiosyncratic risk volatility 
            
Constant  0.0593 0.0506 0.1054 0.0910 0.1624***  0.1694***  0.0438  0.0479 
  (1.12) (0.97) (1.62) (1.45) (2.85) (2.90) (0.71)  (0.80) 
INIT_SHOCK  0.0428***   0.0308***   0.0276***   0.0248***   
  (3.82)   (3.34)   (2.70)   (3.54)   
REM_SHOCK   0.0211***   0.0323***   0.0327***    0.0229*** 
   (3.29)   (2.74)   (3.24)    (3.00) 
Additional control variables:             
             
FCSTREV         -0.2652*  -0.2935*     
         (1.68)  (1.89)     
FIRMRETVOL          0.9826**  0.9967** 
          (2.10)  (2.18) 
             
All  controls  YES  YES YES YES YES YES  YES  YES 
             
Observations  1,784 1,784 1,387 1,387 1,220 1,220  1,792  1,792 
R-squared  0.0282 0.0245 0.0219 0.0224 0.0180 0.0194  0.0265  0.0257 
  
Table 4 
Cross-sectional analysis of the relation between disclosure changes and cost of capital shocks 
Panels A and B present results on the relation between the beta shocks and firms’ disclosure choices for firms with a positive beta shock and high financing 
needs. The first four columns present results partitioning the sample based on a positive initial or remaining shock and high financing needs (POS&HIGH=1), 
where the latter is defined as having a cash flow from investing activities scaled by total assets above the sample median. The last four columns present results 
partitioning the sample based on a positive initial or remaining shock and high financing needs (POS&HIGH=1), where the latter is defined as having external 
financing needs above the median for the sample. External financing needs are measured as the difference between a firm’s average asset growth rate over two 
years and the maximum growth it can finance internally, which is ROA/(1-ROA), where ROA is income before extraordinary items over total assets. Panel A 
presents results for the percent change in the page counts of the 10-K (%ΔPAGES). Panel B presents results for the percent change in the page counts in the 
MD&A (%ΔMDA). The regression models include control variables as defined for Models (2) and (6) in Table 3 and industry-fixed effects based on one-digit 
SIC codes and a binary indicator for Enron-related industries.  The coefficients of the control variables are not presented.  The t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses and based on standard errors that are clustered at two-digit SIC level. *** {**} (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided). The 
last row presents the p-value of a (Chow) test whether the coefficients on the beta shock are statistically different across the two subsamples. 
  (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Proxy for financing needs:  Cash flow from Investment  External financing needs 
 POS&HIGH  POS&HIGH  POS&HIGH  POS&HIGH 
  =1  =0 =1  =0  =1 =0  =1 =0 
Panel A: % page changes in the 10-K           
Constant 0.1563  0.1155**  -0.0149  0.0946**  0.0482  0.1097*  -0.0224  0.0034 
 (1.12)  (2.52)  (-0.22)  (2.49)  (0.72)  (1.83)  (-0.32)  (0.08) 
INIT_SHOCK 0.0521**  0.0167**      0.0348  0.0202**     
 (2.04)  (2.25)      (1.44)  (2.34)     
REM_SHOCK     0.0495  0.0108      0.0669**  0.0101 
     (1.31)  (1.27)      (2.53)  (1.02) 
All  controls  YES  YES YES  YES  YES YES  YES YES 
              
Observations  376  1,127 433  1,070  444 1,349  512 1,281 
R-squared  0.0285  0.0286 0.0498  0.0237  0.0347 0.0249  0.0466 0.0260 
p-value for difference  0.1401  0.3075  0.5743  0.0389 
Panel B: % page changes in MDA           
Constant 0.6157  0.2729***  0.6980  0.2747***  0.2116*  0.2994***  0.2564**  0.3096*** 
  (1.32)  (3.44) (1.50)  (3.52)  (1.82) (4.08)  (2.54) (4.25) 
INIT_SHOCK 0.1121**  -0.0049      0.0509  -0.0144     
 (2.03)  (-0.35)      (1.07)  (-1.01)     
REM_SHOCK     0.0447  -0.0117      0.0106  0.0031 
     (0.90)  (-0.71)      (0.28)  (0.19) 
All  controls  YES  YES YES  YES  YES YES  YES YES 
              
Observations  232  695 232  695  280 789  280 789 
R-squared  0.1066  0.0249 0.0968  0.0255  0.0627 0.0589  0.0600 0.0581 
p-value for difference  0.0478  0.2718  0.1515  0.8585  
Table 4 (continued) 
Cross-sectional analysis of the relation between disclosure changes and cost of capital shocks 
Panel C results on the relation between the beta shocks and firms’ disclosure choices for Arthur Andersen audit clients versus other firms. The first two columns 
use %ΔPAGES as dependent variable. The next columns focus on page changes in the MD&A and the last two columns report results for regressions using 
%ΔREL_PAR.  The regression models include control variables as defined for Models (2) and (6) in Table 3 and industry-fixed effects based on one-digit SIC 
codes and a binary indicator for Enron-related industries. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and based on standard errors that are clustered at two-digit 
SIC level. *** {**} (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided). The last row presents the p-value of a (Chow) test whether the coefficients on 
the beta shock are statistically different across the two subsamples. 
Panel C: Split by auditor    
  %ΔPAGES %ΔΜDA %ΔREL_PAR 
  AA clients  Non-AA clients  AA clients  Non-AA clients  AA clients  Non-AA clients 
Constant 0.1307  0.0211  0.3094**  0.3931***  0.1515  0.4364** 
  (1.20) (0.38) (2.07) (5.01) (0.34) (2.00) 
INIT_SHOCK 0.0612***  0.0193**  0.0241  0.0149  0.2990***  -0.0222 
  (2.74) (2.11) (0.75) (0.91) (3.66) (0.66) 
BETA_PRE  0.0519 0.0434*** 0.0044  0.0319  0.2084*  -0.0435 
  (1.54) (3.01) (0.09) (1.19) (1.65) (0.81) 
All  controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES 
        
Observations 333  1,460  206  863  249  1,008 
R-squared  0.0764 0.0205 0.0755 0.0644 0.1083 0.0104 
p-value for difference  0.0439  0.6963  0.0016 
  
Table 5 
Relation between 10-K disclosure changes and cost of capital shocks controlling for interim disclosure changes 
Results from regressions of the percent change in pages (%ΔPAGES) on the cost of capital shocks and proxies for firms’ interim disclosures.  The interim 
disclosure proxies are: Δ8KCOUNT, which equals the change in the number of 8-K filings from 2000 to 2001; ΔCALL, which equals the change in the number 
of conference calls; %ΔWORDS, which is the percentage change in the number of words in the fourth quarter 2001 earnings announcement; and a market-based 
measure of interim disclosure, the parameter  2 i b ˆ  from the regime-switching model.  See Tables 1 and 2 for more details on these variables.  All models include 
control variables as defined for Models (2) and (6) in Table 3 and industry-fixed effects based on one-digit SIC codes and a binary indicator for Enron-related 
industries. The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and based on standard errors that are clustered at two-digit SIC level. *** {**} (*) indicate significance at 
the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided), respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Constant  0.0990* 0.1040* 0.1019*  0.1070** 0.0603  0.0486 0.1110** 
  (1.88) (1.98) (1.93) (2.03) (1.07) (0.88) (2.12) 
INIT_SHOCK  0.0254***  0.0258***  0.0259***    
  (3.78)  (3.87)  (3.84)    
REM_SHOCK   0.0244***  0.0241***  0.0299***  0.0334*** 
   (3.24)  (3.15)  (3.56)  (3.78) 
BETA_PRE  0.0431** 0.0369** 0.0434** 0.0368** 0.0477** 0.0423** 0.0495** 
  (2.34) (2.04) (2.36) (2.03) (2.41) (2.14) (2.47) 
LASSETS2000  0.0084** 0.0091** 0.0078** 0.0085** 0.0092** 0.0095**  0.0061 
  (2.21) (2.23) (2.10) (2.13) (2.39) (2.30) (1.53) 
ROA2000  -0.0013 -0.0016 0.0005  0.0005 -0.0133 -0.0155 0.0011 
  (0.06) (0.08) (0.02) (0.02) (0.58) (0.66) (0.05) 
DERATIO2000  0.0008 0.0006 0.0016 0.0012 0.0034 0.0037 0.0083 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.10) (0.24) 
MB2000  -0.0004* -0.0003 -0.0003* -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003  -0.0004* 
  (1.78) (1.65) (1.69) (1.53) (1.45) (1.40) (1.89) 
PPE/TA2000  0.0439 0.0325 0.0427 0.0312 0.0446 0.0323 0.0362 
  (0.69) (0.52) (0.68) (0.50) (0.66) (0.48) (0.58) 
Industry controls  YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Δ8KCOUNT  0.0080* 0.0092*     
  (1.77) (1.96)     
ΔCALL     -0.0032  -0.0027 
     (0.45)  (0.39) 
%ΔWORDS       0.0154 0.0163
       (0.68) (0.72)
2 i b    8.4903***
    (3.63)
Observations  1,793 1,793 1,793 1,793 1,646 1,646 1,793 
R-squared  0.0253 0.0249 0.0245 0.0238 0.0275 0.0288 0.0279  
Table 6 
Relation between interim disclosures and cost of capital shocks 
The first four columns of the table present results from four regression models of proxies for interim disclosures on 
combinations of initial shock (INIT_SHOCK), remaining shock (REM_SHOCK), pre-event beta (BETA_PRE), and 
control variables. Column 1 presents results for changes in the number of 8-K filings as defined in Table 1 
(Δ8KCOUNT). In Column 2, we restrict the analysis to changes in the number of 8-K filings during the second-half of 
the event period and hence before the pre-report period during which the remaining shock is measured. Column 3 
presents results for changes in the number of conference calls as defined in Table 1 (ΔCALL). In Column 4, we restrict 
the analysis to changes in the number of conference calls during the second-half of the event period. Columns 5 and 6 
present results from regressing  2 i b ˆ  on Δ8KCOUNT and ΔCALL, respectively, relating the curvature of the quadratic 
beta estimate to firms’ immediate disclosure responses. The control variables are measured as of fiscal year 2000.  The 
models include industry-fixed effects based on one-digit SIC codes and a binary indicator for Enron-related industries. 
The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and based on standard errors that are clustered at two-digit SIC level. 
*** {**} (*) indicates significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level in a two-sided test, respectively. 
  Δ8KCOUNT  ΔCALL 
2 i b ˆ  
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Constant  0.3157*** 0.1103***  0.1143  0.0333*  -0.0049  -0.0009 
  (3.21) (3.56) (1.39)  (1.69)  (0.18)  (0.03) 
INIT_SHOCK  0.0637**  -0.0136      
  (2.19)  (0.71)       
REM_SHOCK   -0.0220**  -0.0085    
   (2.25)   (1.34)     
BETA_PRE  0.0412 -0.0154  -0.0157  0.0029  -0.1128***  -0.1127*** 
  (0.76) (1.28) (0.44)  (0.29)  (16.15)  (15.72) 
LASSETS2000  -0.0724*** 0.0211***  -0.0114  0.0013  0.0177*** 0.0186*** 
  (3.98) (3.52) (0.82)  (0.32)  (3.95)  (4.15) 
ROA2000  0.2421 -0.1069***  -0.0434  -0.0081  0.0021  -0.0035 
  (1.36) (3.39) (0.79)  (0.33)  (0.07)  (0.12) 
DERATIO2000  0.1102  -0.0581 -0.0437 0.0269 -0.0426 -0.0457 
  (0.81) (1.60) (0.66)  (0.85)  (1.47)  (1.57) 
MB2000  -0.0001 0.0010  0.0029*  0.0006 0.0004 0.0005 
  (0.03) (1.17) (1.95)  (1.04)  (1.26)  (1.35) 
PPE/TA2000  -0.0967 0.0001 -0.1373  -0.0136  -0.0852**  -0.0867** 
  (0.67) (0.00) (1.38)  (0.28)  (2.19)  (2.23) 
Δ8KCOUNT        0.0247**   
        (2.63)   
ΔCALL         0.0080 
         ( 0 . 5 7 )  
Industry controls  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES  YES 
Observations  1,793 1,793 1,793  1,793  1,793  1,793 
R-squared  0.0204  0.0335 0.0122 0.0085 0.0770 0.0745  
Table 7 
Analysis of market responses to the changes in the 10-K filings 
Panel A presents an analysis of beta response from the event period to the post-report period: BRESPONSE = 
BETA_EVT - BETA_POST. The models include page changes in the 10-K (%ΔPAGES) and control variables. 
LSIZE is the natural log of firm size as defined in Table 1. DERATIO is long-term debt scaled by total assets and 
MB is the market-to-book ratio as defined in Table 1.  The control variables are measured as of fiscal year 2001.  
The changes in the controls are measured from 2000 to 2001.  The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and based 
on standard errors that are clustered at the firm level. *** {**} (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level 
(two-sided). 
Panel A: Post 10-K beta response    
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Constant -0.2543**  -0.2957***  -0.2062* 
 (2.32)  (2.66)  (1.77) 
%ΔPAGES  0.1726*** 0.1767*** 0.1649*** 
  (2.82) (2.81) (2.58) 
LSIZE2001  0.0106 0.0106 0.0166 
  (1.03) (0.93) (1.43) 
DERATIO2001   0.0353  -0.0133 
   (0.35)  (0.13) 
MB2001   -0.0003  -0.0013 
   (0.04)  (0.19) 
ΔLSIZE     -0.0438 
     (0.65) 
ΔDERATIO     0.3148 
     (1.36) 
ΔMB     0.0609 
     (0.88) 
Industry controls  YES  YES  YES 
      
Observations 1,794  1,700  1,641 
R-squared 0.0168  0.0178  0.0201 
  
Table 7 (continued) 
Analysis of market responses to the changes in the 10-K filings 
Panel B presents models the short-window abnormal volume response around the 10-K filing on the percentage 
change in 10-K pages and control variables. Abnormal volume is defined as stated in Section 6. We include the 
abnormal volume generated by last year’s 10-K filing as a control (ABN_VOL). FIL_DELAY measures the number 
of days the 10-K filing is delayed relative to the filing dates in 2000, adjusted for its delay relative to 1999. LSIZE is 
the natural log of firm size as defined in Table 1, DERATIO is long-term debt scaled by total assets and MB is the 
market-to-book ratio as defined in Table 1.  The control variables are measured as of fiscal year 2001. The 
regression models include industry fixed effects.  The t-statistics are reported in parentheses and based on standard 
errors that are clustered at the firm level. *** {**} (*) indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% level (two-sided). 
Panel B: Short-window abnormal volume response to the 10-K 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
Constant 1.0010  0.9116  0.8903 
 (1.62)  (1.34)  (1.47) 
%ΔPAGES  0.1040* 0.1127* 0.1138* 
 (1.66)  (1.71)  (1.83) 
ABN_VOL2000 0.0465  0.0316  0.0323 
 (1.62)  (1.10)  (1.15) 
FIL_DELAY0199 -0.0015 -0.0013 -0.0022 
 (0.86)  (0.66)  (1.29) 
LSIZE2001 -0.0242**  -0.0265**   
 (2.46)  (2.30)   
MB2001   0.0037   
   (0.39)   
DERATIO2001     0.1379 
     (1.47) 
LASSETS2001     -0.0357*** 
     (2.89) 
ROA2001     0.1681 
     (1.36) 
Industry controls  YES  YES  YES 
      
Observations 1,389  1,316  1,361 
R-squared 0.0173  0.0174  0.0205 
 